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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This paper serves as a background document to help frame discussion at the Food Security 
Forum in Rome, April 2008. It focuses on policy and institutional reform issues centered on the 
links between chronic and transitory crises. The first part of the paper provides an overview of 
trends and future challenges. The second considers effectiveness of the “humanitarian system” in 
addressing food insecurity and whether the current institutional set-up is fit for service. The third 
part examines links between “chronic” and “transitory” food insecurity, and whether current 
approaches to prevention and response appropriately bridge these two forms of vulnerability. A 
concluding section highlights key issues, raising questions on gaps in the humanitarian system’s 
analytical capacity, its programmatic practices, and on food security policy more broadly. 
Trends and Challenges 
Humanitarian crises with food security dimensions are increasing in frequency, scope and 
complexity. There is a growing reservoir of vulnerable states, characterized by fragile economies 
and by livelihoods pursued by economically and physiologically vulnerable people. Shocks are 
not independent drivers of food crises—they are part of the underlying problems to be resolved 
in the development process. Coping capacities continue to be eroded through the combined 
effects of ill health, undernutrition and deep poverty which lay communities open to vagaries of 
climate, global market conditions, epidemics or the traumas linked with contested ownership of 
natural and other resources.  
The drivers of future crises will not all be the same as in the past. Even if fewer people are dying 
in emergencies than a decade ago, a growing number are affected, and this links to chronic food 
insecurity and impaired development. The rising scale of impacts is linked to the concentration 
of poor people in vulnerable locations. In addition, new challenges arise. Climate change is 
likely to aggravate existing production and consumption constraints in food insecure countries. 
Shifts in ecosystems, increased climatic shocks, and the emergence of new or renewed crop, 
livestock and human diseases all pose threats to food supply, marketing (cross-border trade), and 
rural income streams. Current food (and fuel) prices are cause for concern, requiring attention to 
resource constraints for humanitarian action, appropriate policy and programmatic responses to 
new populations in need, and planning for a future in which many more people may have 
inadequate consumption.  
Several dozen countries recording frequent food crises in the past continue to need external 
assistance today, and these same countries face multiple threats to their future stability. This begs 
questions about the sufficiency and/or effectiveness of humanitarian and development aid. But 
since some countries appear to be improving in their food security, with reduced emergency 
appeals, some things are apparently being done right; what are those things, and are they 
replicable? Lessons need to be shared on how to leverage and maximize such gains—which in 
many cases remain very fragile.  
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Humanitarian Effectiveness 
Recent criticisms of much humanitarian action focus on analytical capacity (assessments of need, 
cost-effectiveness, impact); the ability to allocate resources impartially; the ability to link 
analysis or early warning to a timely and appropriate response; balanced responses to food 
security crises and the engagement of humanitarian food security actors at the policy level; and 
limited ability to link the short-term protection of food consumption with long-term 
improvements in production and access. From a humanitarian perspective, there is an additional 
problem around the definition of effectiveness or “success.” 
There are serious on-going efforts to address these issues. However, there has been a lack of trust 
between humanitarian actors, donors and some national governments that has limited the 
capacity to link analysis to programming. What is more, despite improvements in some areas 
there have recently been renewed criticisms that humanitarian agencies are not very good at 
learning from their own mistakes. 
“Food security interventions” encompass numerous approaches, including food provisioning, 
cash and voucher transfers, interventions that protect or restore productive assets and capacities. 
Constraints to the effectiveness of interventions include the level of funding, sectoral balance of 
resource allocation, and the ability of agencies to work across different time-frames (short-term; 
long-term). The “architecture” of the aid industry itself is a form of constraint in this regard. 
Multiple actors, with different (and multiple) mandates, and limited ability of governments (and 
limited willingness to agencies) to coordinate, are also a constraint to effectiveness. 
Reform processes have begun to address some of these issues. UN Reform has perhaps been the 
most far-reaching, although to date there are only a handful of evaluations of this reform, most of 
which are formative in nature, with few questions about reform firmly answered. A significant 
question to come out of these evaluations, however, is whether a “food security” cluster would 
be helpful in addressing some of the issues raised above? Donors and humanitarian agencies 
have also had reform processes. 
Linking Solutions to Chronic and Transitory Food Insecurity 
There are major gaps—conceptual, policy, programmatic, and funding-related—in current 
approaches to tackling chronic and transitory food insecurity. The result is an overemphasis on 
response (often too little too late) rather than prevention, a failure to sustainably alleviate 
suffering, and a steady erosion of many populations’ ability to cope with the twin threats of 
chronic suffering and repeat shocks.  
In most current approaches the starting point for action is typically the crisis itself, and debate 
often centers on what can be done from there forward to reduce future risk and promote 
improved security. An alternative model, such as one focused on longer-term social protection, 
relies on determining in advance of a crisis which segments of a population are at risk from what 
sources of hazard, and intervening with mechanisms that are able to avert or mitigate a crisis 
before it occurs. This implies a redirection of funding away from mechanisms and institutions 
that are typically engaged to deal with emergency response, and in some cases, a different role 
for humanitarian assistance altogether. 
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The principles of stability, predictability, and timing of an intervention may be as critical to 
social protection intervention effectiveness as the resource transfer itself. These qualities enable 
beneficiaries to make informed decisions about how to manage in the face of risk based on a 
realistic assessment of the timing and size of available resources. But effective protection 
requires a well-functioning state apparatus with capacity to assess and respond to real need. 
Government motivation, capacity, and longer-term funding are all critical to implementing a 
sustained set of targeted policies and programs, and these are lacking in many large complex 
emergencies. However, where chronic need coincides with government commitment, there may 
be opportunities for the humanitarian community to play a modified role—moving away from 
direct implementation and instead devoting more attention to influencing the policy process, 
advocacy, generating an evidence base, and social mobilization of civil society (i.e., supporting 
the demand side).  
At the same time, more focus on disaster risk reduction can be incorporated into social protection 
frameworks. In practice, this implies an explicit focus on reducing exposure to covariate sources 
of risk. In practice, disaster risk reduction investments often fail to make explicit links to 
livelihood protection and food security. Risk reduction includes food security early warning 
systems, environmental protection and rehabilitation, and agricultural resilience techniques. 
While such activities are often promoted there is often a lack of empirical evidence to attest to 
their effectiveness and limited connection with other sectors necessary to social and economic 
growth. The actual value of food security early warning systems is largely unknown. While their 
information is often used to solicit resources from the international community, there is no 
understanding of the magnitude of resources warning systems attract or the links between 
resources raised, interventions supported, and reduced vulnerability to the processes 
underpinning warnings in general.  
Analytical tools such as cost benefit analysis, environmental assessment, and risk-response 
assessment show promise for analyzing the effectiveness of risk reduction activities.  
Key Questions for Discussion 
A number of key questions are raised for deliberation at the Forum (not all listed here): Can the 
humanitarian food security community improve its analysis to reflect changing realities on the 
ground, enable appropriate responses, and improve timeliness of response?  
Can impact measurement regarding food security be improved and incorporated routinely into 
emergency interventions? How important is the impartial allocation of resources to humanitarian 
food security response? What mechanisms are possible to hold cluster leads more accountable 
for inaction or ineffective coordination? Should some agencies specialize in “humanitarian” or 
“development” arenas, or should mandates expand to cover various forms of activity that cut 
across conventional funding windows? Is the “community” willing to fight (against significant 
political odds) for greater impartiality?  
Can the humanitarian community do a better job of costing “preventive” measures? And, what 
are the trade-offs between improved coherence of transitory and chronic responses on the one 
hand, and decreased independence of humanitarian action in complex emergencies on the other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Only through investment in Somalia’s relief, development, and peace-building…will Somalia be 
able to become investment-sustaining and catalyze the fragile peace effort. 
UN/DHA, May 1997 
More than a quarter of the population of Somalia is in humanitarian crisis. 
FSAU/Somalia, January 2008 
On February 14, 2008, the BBC ran a story entitled “Somalia is ‘the forgotten crisis.’ ” How can 
that be? In the period between 2003 and 2006, Somalia received roughly US$1 billion in net 
disbursements of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), compared with only $161 million in 
1995–96.1 It was the country in which the innovative Integrated Phase Classification tool was 
first developed by the Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU), aimed at enhancing objective 
analysis of the complex factors that link food and livelihood insecurity to humanitarian crises in 
ways that generate multiple agency agreement and synergistic action. It is a country that gained 
visibility as one of the most distantly affected by the Asian tsunami in 2005, and earned a degree 
of geopolitical significance in the global “war on terror” during 2006–07. Yet, in 2008, Somalia 
features prominently in the 2008 Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), with an estimated need 
for humanitarian aid amounting to $406 billion. Apparently, neither food insecurity nor 
humanitarian need have been effectively resolved in Somalia to date. Why not?  
On the one hand, it could be that conditions have recently deteriorated—which is partly true, 
given the continued absence of stable governance, competing political agendas, armed conflict, 
and repeated natural shocks (droughts, floods, locusts). On the other hand, it could be that 
resources used in recent years have been inadequate to the task of resolving or at least mitigating 
such shocks, or the wrong kind of assistance was given, or aid was used in the wrong ways, or 
resources were spent very inefficiently—all of which may also be true.  
So will the response to the current CAP or future years’ relief responses make any marked 
difference in either food security or humanitarian need? Indeed, will development aid more 
broadly improve the lives of people across the developing world in coming years? According to 
the OECD’s most recent Development Co-operation Report progress is being made in improving 
social as well as economic conditions around the globe, but far too slowly.2 Higher volumes of 
aid are helping some countries, but despite efforts by donor and recipient countries to “use aid 
more effectively” progress remains modest and in some cases, fragile. Again, the question is 
why?  
This discussion paper serves as background to help frame discussion during the Food Security 
Forum in Rome. The content focuses primarily on policy and institutional issues relating to 
chronic and transitory crises (or high risk of these) and the reforms in policies and systems 
needed to better protect lives and livelihoods, manage the process of recovery, and reduce future 
                                                 
1 DAC/OECD (Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development). 2008. Development Co-Operation Report 2007. Volume 9, No. 1. Paris.  
2 Ibid. 
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risks and vulnerabilities that threaten food security. The paper has three separate themes, bundled 
together. The first part offers an overview of trends, projections and challenges in the realms of 
global food insecurity and humanitarian emergencies. The second part examines issues relating 
to effectiveness of the “humanitarian system” specifically in addressing food insecurity. The 
third part considers links among responses to “chronic” and “transitory” food insecurity. The 
purpose of the paper is not to provide a consensus statement on any of these topics, but rather to 
review evidence and pose a series of questions for discussion during the Food Security Forum on 
ways forward. 
The issue of effectiveness of the humanitarian system is itself broken down into seven sections. 
Section 1 is an overview of the effectiveness question, and recent critiques of humanitarian 
action to protect food security. The second briefly reviews the kinds of crises that cause 
widespread food insecurity. The third covers interventions aimed at transitory and/or chronic 
food security. The fourth examines recent innovations and issues in food security analysis. The 
fifth sketches out the current “architecture” of the humanitarian response mechanisms to address 
food insecurity. The sixth examines on-going reform and change processes. And the final section 
reviews effectiveness of the “system,” drawing out questions for discussion at the Forum. 
The theme dealing with linking “chronic” and “transitory” food insecurity is in four sections. 
The first is a framework for understanding the linkages. The second section examines approaches 
to social protection, while the third similarly examines approaches to disaster risk reduction. The 
fourth section assesses linkages–drawing out questions for discussion at the Food Security 
Forum. 
A brief conclusions section summarizes major questions and gaps arising from the three parts of 
the paper. This includes gaps or questions regarding (1) analytical capacity and knowledge, (2) 
programmatic practice, and (3) food security policy. 
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PART 1. OVERVIEW OF TODAY’S  
FOOD INSECURITY PROBLEMS 
Issues and Trends in Acute and Temporal Food Crises  
According to a recent concept paper on Good Humanitarian Donorship, “humanitarian crises are 
on the increase in terms of frequency, scope and complexity. From 1990 to 2005, official 
humanitarian spending by DAC members increased fourfold–from US$2.3 billion to $8.2 billion. 
These trends will probably continue.” 3 While 2005 was unusual, in that total humanitarian 
funding of $13 billion was almost double that of the recent high of $7.7 billion in 2003 (due to 
the Indian Ocean tsunami), funding exceeded $7.5 billion in both 2006 and 2007, while 2008 is 
shaping up to at least match such levels (reaching almost $2 billion before the end of the first 
quarter).4 Indeed, the Humanitarian Futures Programme projects a 25 percent increase in the 
number of people affected by crises, and requiring assistance, in South and Central Asia and East 
and Southern Africa alone between 2001 and 2015.5  
Yet the drivers of future humanitarian crises will not inevitably be the same as in past years. 
First, there has been a decline in the number and scale of inter-state and intra-state conflicts, 
reflecting resolution of many post-Cold War tensions that flared up in the 1990s with the break-
up of the Soviet Union. Indeed, while reporting a “decline in conflicts,” the 2008 CAP highlights 
four countries/regions that featured in previous CAPs but not the current one—in essence, 
proposing that these are humanitarian crises that have successfully “graduated” from the appeals 
process.6  
That said, the number of people affected by conflicts are still high, and new drivers of crises are 
on the horizon.7 While global battle deaths have been decreasing over most of this period, 
mainly due to a decline in interstate and internationalized armed conflict, conflict-related deaths 
may not have.8 For example, although Figure 1 shows a significant decline in battle deaths even 
during the 1990s (which includes armed actions in countries like Rwanda, Afghanistan, 
Eritrea/Ethiopia, and the DRC), there is no systematic international assessment of civilian (or 
even combatant) mortality linked to the effects of disease, displacement, trauma, etc. This means 
                                                 
3 Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative. 2007. Good Humanitarian Donorship and Disaster Risk Reduction: A 
Concept Paper. July 2007. Mimeo.  
4 http://ocha.unog.ch/fts2/by_sector.asp. 
5 Humanitarian Futures Programme (HFP), King’s College London. 2007. Dimensions of Crisis Impacts: 
Humanitarian Needs by 2015. Report prepared for the Department for International Development. London. 
6 The Great Lakes Regional activity, Congo (Rep.), Liberia and Burundi. See OCHA 2008. Humanitarian Appeal 
2008. http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1637
7 The 2008–2009 Global Appeal by UNHCR notes that it is already facing the uphill task of finding the resources 
needed to assist close to 33 million refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless people and the internally displaced. 
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/3b7b87e14.html
8 Lacina, B., and N. Gleditsch. 2004. Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths. 
European Journal of Population. 21 (2–3): 145–66.  
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there is currently no way to assess trends in deaths associated with complex emergencies—a gap 
that should be urgently filled.9  
Figure 1: Worldwide Battle Deaths 1946–2002 
 
Source: Reproduced from B. Lacina and N. Gleditsch. 2004. Monitoring Trends in Global 
Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths. European Journal of Population 21 (2–3): 145–66. 
As a result, it is likely that the decline in conflicts has yet to translate into a fall in the number of 
people impacted by conflict. The World Bank points out that today: “nearly one-third of the 
world’s extremely poor people—27 percent—live in countries that are fragile or conflict-
affected.”10 Many populations affected by past conflicts (involving the loss of income earners, 
income streams or assets) are vulnerable to additional hazards, be they natural disasters or new 
forms of conflict such as “resource wars” (contested use of natural resources, including water, oil 
and even arable land), that according to some analysts will become increasingly likely.11 This 
suggests a need for more focus on linkages between governance failures (including breakdown in 
delivery of services), conflicts, and humanitarian outcomes (such as epidemics of cholera or 
measles, life-threatening outbreaks of micronutrient deficiency diseases, and increases in 
prenatal mortality linked to population displacements or other traumas). 
                                                 
9 Of course, recent attempts to measure civilian mortality in DRC, Darfur and Iraq highlight the methodological 
difficulties and political pitfalls involved. But they also underline the urgent need for analytical clarity and 
objectivity in comparing rates across countries and over time. See: Murray, C., et al. 2002. Armed Conflict as a 
public health problem. British Medical Journal. 324:346–9. 
10 The World Bank defines “fragile states” as countries characterized by a combination of weak governance, 
policies, and institutions which are often trapped in a vicious cycle of armed conflict and economic and social 
collapse. World Bank. 2007. Post-Conflict Fund and Licus Trust Fund: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2007. 
Washington, DC. 
11 HFP, op. cit.  
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The second “new” driver of crises is rising frequency of disasters, some with greater intensity. 
The 2008 CAP reports a recent marked increase in, and record number of, Flash Appeals which 
reflects the rise in people affected by disasters—climbing by a third from the mid-1990s to the 
mid-2000s.12 On average, 200 million people were affected by natural disasters globally each 
year between 1992 and 2001, a period during which disasters claimed an annual average of 
62,000 lives.13 Figure 2 illustrates the upward trend in reported events since the 1980s. If such 
trends continue it has been estimated that “by 2050 natural disasters could have a global cost of 
over US$300 billion a year, and will be a key element in the failure to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals.” 14 15  
Figure 2: Occurrence of Natural Disasters, 1987–2006 
 
Source: Reproduced from P. Hoyois et al. 2007. Annual Disaster Statistical Review: Numbers 
and Trends. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Catholic University of 
Louvain, Belgium.  
Such large scale economic and human losses are related to two factors: on the one hand, an 
“increasing frequency and intensity of extreme events”, notably droughts, floods, tropical 
cyclones and hailstorms.”16 In 2006, there were 427 reported natural disasters compared with an 
annual average of 393 for the 2000–2004 period—the main increase coming in the form of large 
                                                 
12 Arnold, M., et. al. (eds.) 2006. Natural Disaster HotSpots: Case Studies. Disaster Risk Management Series. 
Washington, DC. 
13 CRED (Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters), University of Louvain, Belgium, various years. 
http://www.cred.be/
14 Atkinson, R. 2007. Editorial. Humanitarian Exchange. 38 (6) 1–2.  
15 Yates, R. et. Al. 2002. Development at Risk. Briefing paper for the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August–4 September 2002.  
16 Bruinsma, J. (ed.) 2003. World agriculture: towards 2015/2030. Rome: FAO/Earthscan. 
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floods.17 However, if a longer time-frame it considered, it is a combination of floods, tsunamis, 
major droughts and cyclones/hurricanes that together account for the largest increase (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Hydro Meteorological Disasters, 1987–2006 
 
Source: Reproduced from P. Hoyois et al. 2007. Annual Disaster Statistical Review: 
Numbers and Trends. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Catholic 
University of Louvain, Belgium.  
On the other hand, the impact of natural hazards has grown because of rising concentration of 
people in vulnerable locations, and the growing vulnerability of people in poorest countries—
particularly those exposed to eroded natural resources as well as depletion of human capital due 
to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and other debilitating diseases. Figure 4 shows that even ignoring 
spikes caused by the Kobe earthquake and hurricane Katrina, the trend in economic damage 
associated with disasters is upward. But importantly, large events are not driving the trend. There 
has been a decrease of around 15 percent (between 1987 and 2006) in “large” disasters (causing 
losses of between 0.1 and 0.49 percent of GDP to affected countries), replaced by a three-fold 
increase in disasters causing less than 0.1 percent GDP losses (Figure 5).18 While this may seem 
like a desirable trend, the relatively smaller droughts and floods account for a greater share of the 
absolute increase in economic losses. This is of concern since while such apparently low-impact 
disasters are less visible they have the potential to cause serious aggregate damage through 
compounded losses in income foregone over the long run. At the same time, given their 
individually smaller impacts on GDP growth, these low-impact droughts and floods have less 
political and donor (and media) visibility than major discrete events, attracting lesser funding in 
terms of relief and reconstruction, which leaves affected populations still vulnerable to similar 
risks.  
                                                 
17 CRED. Op. cit.  
18 For comparative purposes, the Maldives’ losses relating to the Asian tsunami amounted to 66 percent of GDP, 
while Hurricane Mitch caused damage equal to 41 percent of GDP in Honduras. World Bank. 2006. Hazards of 
Nature, Risks to Development. Washington DC. 
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Figure 4: Economic Damage Associated with Natural Disasters, 1987–2006 
 
Source: Reproduced from P. Hoyois et al. 2007. Annual Disaster Statistical Review: Numbers 
and Trends. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Catholic University of 
Louvain, Belgium.  
In other words, impaired development is integrally linked with the cumulative effects of 
shocks—small as well as large.19 This is understood by affected communities, but is arguably 
less so at the level of national governments and international donors. UNDP’s most recent 
Human Development Report argues that environmental hazards figure prominently in the lives of 
the poor by, “eroding long-term opportunities for human development, undermining 
productivity.” 20 That was acknowledged in Kenya’s recent national development report: 
“economic recovery since 2003 has provided the country with a new opportunity to reduce 
poverty levels. However, with the recent drought in the country, there have been some setbacks 
in such areas as the elimination of hunger and chronic malnutrition.” 21 The likely re-occurrence 
of disasters in areas identified as disaster risk hotspots suggest that aggressive measures are 
needed to reduce risks of future losses.  
                                                 
19 M. Dilley et al. 2005. Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis. Washington, DC: World 
Bank/Columbia University. 
20 United Nations Development Program. 2007. Human Development Report. New York. 
21 Ibid. 
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Figure 5: Trends in Economic Damage Caused by Various Categories of 
Natural Disasters (in 2006 US$ million), 1987–2006 
 
Source: Reproduced from P. Hoyois et al. 2007. Annual Disaster Statistical Review: Numbers 
and Trends. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Catholic University of 
Louvain, Belgium. 
But while more attention has been paid to risk reduction recently this has not yet translated into 
the large-scale investments that are called for, particularly where growth has not yet sufficiently 
reduced future vulnerabilities. That is, the process of development itself carries risks until growth 
and investments have reached a level that allows for sufficient risk-proofing not only of national 
economies but also of citizen’s livelihoods. Poverty reduction is certainly happening. The World 
Bank’s Global Economic Prospects report predicts that by 2030 the number of people living on 
less than the equivalent of $1 per day will fall by half from current levels (1.2 billion), to about 
550 million.22 The projections call for global economic growth in the 2006 to 2030 period to be 
faster than in 1980 to 2005, the important difference being that global growth will be 
increasingly driven by developing countries, where per capita incomes are expected to rise by 3.0 
percent a year on average.  
This is even true of Africa. According to the World Bank, “something decidedly new is on the 
horizon in Africa, something that began in the mid-1990s. Many African economies appear to 
have turned the corner and moved to a path of faster and steadier economic growth. Their 
performance over 1995–2005 reverses the collapses over 1975–85 and the stagnations over 
1985–95. And for the first time in three decades, African economies are growing with the rest of 
the world.” 23 Average growth in Sub-Saharan Africa was 5.4 percent in 2005 and 2006. The 
consensus projection for 2008 is 5.4 percent. While this is in part supported by high world prices 
                                                 
22 World Bank. 2007. Global Economic Prospects. Washington, DC. 
23 World Bank. 2008. African Development Indicators 2007. Washington, DC. 
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for oil and minerals (therefore only benefiting exporters of natural resources), eighteen countries 
whose economies do not rely on mineral exports have also been doing well—countries 
containing more than a third of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa. The low productivity and 
low investment that hampered much of Africa in the 1970s and 1980s is turning around. There is 
evidence of improvements in output per worker and countries with higher “efficiency” (in terms 
of return on investment, such as Mozambique, Rwanda, and Botswana) are on par with India and 
Vietnam. 
A key feature of such growth is a rapid, large-scale relocation of population to urban areas. 
Already the world’s population is more urban than rural; by 2030 the share of developing 
country inhabitants living in cities is projected to be 56 percent.24 While there is a strong 
association between urbanization, income diversification, increased specialization/productivity 
and poverty reduction, there are also negatives: (1) UNFPA argues that the impacts of climate 
hazards disproportionately affect people “who live in slum and squatter settlements on steep 
hillsides, in poorly drained areas, or in low-lying coastal zones.” 25 Indeed, part of the 
explanation for increasing economic losses in natural disasters is the physical concentrations of 
people in places where shocks can cause concentrated damage. (2) Urban concentrations result in 
higher demand for food (as diets change), with fewer people on the farms to produce locally—
exposing more consumers to the vagaries of world market prices. Economies such as 
Mozambique’s, Guatemala’s or Cambodia’s may be growing, but they are not doing so at a rate 
that sustains buffers for their poorest inhabitants, and the rural- (peri-) urban shift can put many 
more people in potential harm’s way without a functioning government safety net. This has 
implications for future humanitarian interventions; is the international community sufficiently 
attuned to the potential for large-scale urban catastrophes, able to assess urban needs and able to 
intervene to protect food insecurity in non-agrarian settings? 
The World Bank acknowledges that its long-term growth projections could be impacted by many 
unknowns, including disasters. However, the projections are deemed “robust enough to resist 
periodic recessions, isolated regional conflicts, and even many of the destabilizing crises the 
world has experienced in the past thirty years. These threats are likely to affect particular 
regional or national economies more than the world economy.” 26 Even if true, the problem for 
humanitarians is that destabilizing crises are indeed localized, particularly affecting those regions 
and households least able to deal with them. That is, there are whole countries, regions and 
people “left behind.” 
Chronic Food Insecurity 
One of the standard measures of longer-term food insecurity is FAO’s metric of “chronic 
undernourishment”—one of two metrics used to measure progress in reducing “hunger” as part 
of the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG). MDG1’s target is to halve by 2015 the 
proportion of “hungry” people from the 1990 level. It was decided to measure “hunger” in this 
context by considering undernourished populations as a whole, on the one hand, and 
undernourished children (aged less than five years) on the other. According to FAO, “we are 
                                                 
24 United Nations Population Division. 2007. World Urbanization Prospects. New York. 
25 UN Population Fund. 2007. State of World Population 2007. New York. 
26 World Bank 2007. Op. cit.  
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confronted with the sad reality that virtually no progress has been made towards that objective. 
Compared with 1990–92, the number of undernourished people in developing countries has 
declined by a meager three million–a number within the bounds of statistical error.” 27 For 
instance, in 2000, FAO combined estimates of both the prevalence of chronic undernourishment 
(energy gap at population level) and the depth of undernourishment (measured by the average 
dietary energy deficit of undernourished people—not of the population as a whole) into five 
“food deprivation” groups, the most deprived having high prevalence of undernourishment and 
high energy deficit. What they found was a list of twenty-three countries in the most deprived 
group which all faced “chronic instability and conflict, poor governance, erratic weather, 
endemic poverty, agricultural failure, population pressure and fragile ecosystems go hand in 
hand with deep, widespread and persistent hunger.” 28 The top ten countries were Somalia, 
Afghanistan, Haiti, Mozambique, Burundi, Liberia, DRC, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Niger—a list of 
usual suspects, all of which have appeared in CAP and/or Flash Appeals since 2000, and most of 
which continue to be characterized by the same problems.29 These are countries with large 
reservoirs of problems which take little to overflow into acute crises.  
The same goes for child undernutrition—the other “hunger” measure for MDG1. While progress 
is being made in reducing global prevalence of low weight-for-age in children under five years 
of age progress is slow (few low income countries will reach the MDG1 target by 2015), and 
uneven (large numbers of undernourished children continue to inhabit fast growth countries like 
Vietnam and Bangladesh, as well as low growth countries like Ethiopia, Pakistan and Haiti).30 
Indeed, the prevalence of wasting (acute malnutrition carrying a high mortality risk) has been 
increasing at a global level.31 Each sub-region of Africa has seen rising levels of wasting 
between 1990 and 2005, but even a high economic growth country like India has reported an 
increase in wasting prevalence of 3 percent between 1998–99 and 2005–06.32 This matters 
because the most severe human outcome associated with disasters is mortality, which in 
humanitarian crises tends to be mediated through acute malnutrition. That is, a large and growing 
reservoir of acutely malnourished children (and adults) in itself represents an underlying 
vulnerability to disasters, such that temporal shocks compound and aggravate pre-existing 
conditions.  
For example, Table 1 provides lists of the “top ten” (i.e., worst ten) countries ranked according to 
a variety of indices, including chronic undernourishment (column 5) and child wasting (column 
7). While this table includes data from a wide range of published sources, each having its own 
methodology for ranking and comparing diverse countries, it offers some interesting (sometimes 
surprising) comparisons that can be discussed. The first ten columns (Tables 1a and 1b) are 
rankings relating to current conditions, reflecting the recent past—where countries stand and 
what they have been through in the past ten to fifteen years—while columns 11–14 (Table 1c) 
                                                 
27 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 2007. State of Food Insecurity in the World. 
Rome. 
28 FAO. 2000. The State of Food Insecurity in the World. Rome. 
29 The exceptions may be Mozambique and Liberia which today appear to be pulling away from the rest of the 
group. 
30 UN Standing Committee on Nutrition. 2005. 5th Update on the World Nutrition Situation. Geneva.  
31 UN Standing Committee on Nutrition. 2004. 5th Report on the World Nutrition Situation. Geneva, Switzerland; 
World Bank. 2006. Repositioning Nutrition. Washington, DC. 
32 Government of India. 2007. National Family Health Survey (NFHS–3). New Delhi.  
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suggest potential threats to countries based on current status and projected near future. These 
lists suggest that: 
1. While the elements of “insecurity” addressed in each list are not identical many countries 
feature on most of the rankings—in other words, while there are multiple factors at play in 
generating vulnerabilities to food (and other forms of) insecurity, there are certain countries 
with exposure to multiple threats. As a result, resolving one threat or set of risks in isolation 
of the others may not succeed in resolving or reducing underlying vulnerability.  
2. A “core” set of countries that features most often in recent crises (including Afghanistan, 
DRC, Somalia, C.A.R, Chad, Niger, Sudan, and so on), continued to feature in lists that 
relate to continuing threat of future instability (Table 1c). This means that a large number of 
developing countries (thirty-two separate countries make the top ten lists in columns 11–14 
alone) continue to warrant serious attention. Most of these appear in FAO’s March 2008 list 
of thirty-six “countries in crisis requiring external assistance.” 33 What should be done 
differently to plan for, and seek to prevent, increased humanitarian need in any one or all of 
those hotspots in the coming decade? 
3. Several countries featuring in most lists relating to recent conditions (columns 1–10), have all 
but disappeared from the lists relating to projected risks in coming years (columns 11–14). 
Places like Mozambique and Haiti, as well as Burundi and Liberia (two of the nations that 
“graduated” from the CAP appeal in 2008), appear to have made some progress, suggesting 
that successes are possible. This is a positive development that should be more widely 
recognized. What can be learned from those two cases that might be transferable to other 
ongoing crises? 
In other words, not only is global economic growth uneven (spatially) and still too slow to help 
even stable countries to make needed investments in social safety nets and other buffers against 
future shocks, current growth is itself fragile in many parts of the world. The danger of regress is 
all too real when serious threats to growth are not taken into account beyond the humanitarian 
community. A large group of countries remains food insecure despite considerable humanitarian 
and/or developmental resource flows.34 But those countries continue to be weak if not 
dysfunctional, facing continued threat of conflict even in “peace,” What is more, while these 
well-known threats to food insecurity continue to fester new challenges are on the horizon which 
may in some cases constitute large scale “destabilizers” of still fragile equilibriums.  
New Challenges to Global and Local Food Insecurity 
There are many emerging and re-emerging that could be discussed here, including the potential 
for pandemic diseases (such as, but not restricted to, Avian influenza), the risk posed by growing 
water insecurity to world food supplies, new threats on labor productivity relating to the global 
obesity epidemic, and so on. But space only permits us to consider two of the current big ticket 
items; namely, potential impacts of a) climate change and b) global pressures on food prices.  
Where climate change is concerned, there is an increasing convergence among global models. 
According to the Humanitarian Futures Programme, “global climate change is an over-arching 
                                                 
33 http://www.fao.org/giews/english/hotspots/index.htm. 
34 FAO. 2007. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2006. Rome.  
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factor that will directly and indirectly impact upon a range of drivers which will in turn intensify 
humanitarian crisis agents that expose human beings to major humanitarian crises.” 35 The broad 
messages with regard to food security impacts are that (1) climate changes will play out 
differently across latitudes (resulting in gainers and losers), and (2) many of today’s food 
insecure countries will feature among the losers, leading to deepening of production and 
consumption problems. One report suggests that in some forty poor developing countries with a 
combined current population of two billion, including 450 million undernourished people, 
production losses are likely to “drastically increase the number of undernourished.” 36 Similarly, 
a recent study by the World Bank suggests that “increases in seasonal temperature have negative 
effects for most of the African continent.” 37 More specifically, the share of arable land in 
tropical regions is expected to decrease. The World Bank’s projections are particularly 
worrisome for Africa, given that they suggest a loss of more than 4 percent of total arable land 
by 2039—faster in some regions, with eastern Africa losing up to 15 percent of its cropland area 
within the next thirty years.  
Such projections are mirrored by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which 
foresees increased droughts and floods affecting “crop production negatively, especially in 
subsistence sectors at low latitudes.” 38 A new study that pools consensus views of more than 52 
environmental experts suggests that a global temperature rise of more than three degrees 
Centigrade is likely and this would bring about more intense (higher amplitude) El Nino effects 
which are linked to severe droughts and cyclonic activity around the world.39 This has 
implications for countries that already face chronic food insecurity and frequent emergencies, as 
well as an already eroded or fragile natural resource base, and aggravating factors like 
HIV/AIDS. Stige et al. argue that southern Africa will “experience notable reductions” in maize 
production and Lenton et al. concurs, suggesting that southern Africa risks losing 30 percent of 
its coarse grain output by 2030.40 Countries such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Malawi face a 
reduction in the growing season that may reduce yields by as much as 50 percent by 2020, and 
net revenue from cropping could be reduced by as much as 90 percent by 2100.41 And across 
Africa, “there could be hundreds of millions of additional people at risk of serious reductions in 
crop yields,” while across Asia “about 1 billion people would face risks from reduced 
agricultural production potential.” 42  
                                                 
35 HFG. 2007. Op. Cit. 
36 G. Fischer, M. Shah, H. van Velthuizen, and F. Nachtergaele. 2001. Global Agro-ecological Assessment for 
Agriculture in the 21st Century. Laxenburg, Austria:  International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.  
37 A. Lotsch. 2007. Sensitivity of Cropping Patterns in Africa to Transient Climate Change. Policy Research 
Working Paper 4289. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
38 M. Boko et.al. 2007. Africa. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of 
Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Edited by 
M. Parry et. al. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, pp, 433–467. These authors also suggest that wheat 
production is expected “to disappear from Africa by the 2080s.”  
39 Lenton, T. et al. 2008. Tipping elements in the Earth’s climate system. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences. 105 (6): 1786–93. 
40Stige, L., J. Stave, K. Chan, L. Ciannelli, N. Pretorelli, M. Glantz, H. Herren and N. Stenseth. 2006. The effect of 
climate variation on agro-pastoral production in Africa. Proc. National Academy of Sciences, USA. 103: 3049–53.  
41 Ibid.  
42Schneider, S. et al. 2007: Assessing key vulnerabilities and the risk from climate change. In Parry, M. et al. 
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth 
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Table 1: “Top Ten” Country Rankings According to Different Measures of Food Insecurity and 
Humanitarian Need (The “worst” case at the top of each column) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Global Needs Poverty and  Deadliest Global Hunger Percent  
Assessment Score Hunger Index43 Conflicts Index44 Undernourished45
2007–0846  of 1990s47
Afghanistan Sierra Leone Rwanda Burundi Eritrea  
Angola CAR Angola DRC DRC 
Benin Burundi Somalia Eritrea Burundi 
Burundi Niger Bosnia Sierra Leone Tajikistan 
C.A.R Zambia Liberia Ethiopia Sierra Leone 
Chad Madagascar Burundi Liberia Liberia 
DRC Uganda Chechnya Niger Haiti 
Cote d’Ivoire Zimbabwe Tajikistan Yemen Ethiopia 
Djibouti Nigeria Algeria Angola Zimbabwe 
East Timor Rwanda Gulf War Comoros C.A.R 
 
(6) (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  
Dietary Energy  Child Wasting48 Frequency of % population Recipients of  
Deficit49  mid-2000s CAP appearance affected by natural bilateral  
late 1990s  1995–200650 disasters 200651 humanitarian aid  
    (gross 2006) 52
Somalia Pakistan Sudan Malawi Sudan 
Afghanistan Burkina Faso Iraq Burundi Pakistan 
Haiti Djibouti Afghanistan Niger Afghanistan 
Mozambique India Angola Djibouti Iraq 
Burundi Sudan (North) Ethiopia Kenya Somalia 
Liberia Laos Serbia & Montenegro Philippines Indonesia 
DRC Togo Bosnia Herzegovina Mali DRC 
Sierra Leone Sri Lanka Afghanistan Afghanistan Lebanon  
Eritrea Chad Palestinian Territories Mozambique Sri Lanka 
Niger DRC Former Yugoslavia China Myanmar 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, pp: 779–810.  
43 Net progress towards MDG1 based on all 5 official measures of poverty and hunger. Source: U. Gentilini and P. Webb. 
2008. How Are We Doing on Poverty and Hunger Reduction? A New Measure of Country Performance. Mimeo.  
44 An index combining children underweight, child mortality, and national chronic undernourishment). Source: 
International Food Policy Research Institute. 2007. The Challenge of Hunger 2007. Washington, DC. 
45 Source: FAO. 2007. The State of the World’s Food Insecurity 2007. Rome.  
46 ECHO GNA Web site (countries listed alphabetically). 
47 Murray, C et. al. 2002. Armed Conflict as a public health problem. British Medical Journal. 324:346–9 
48 Moderate and severe wasting in children less than 5 (mid 2000s), excluding UAE and Mauritius, both being 
somewhat special cases. Source: childinfo.org  
49 “Depth” of hunger. FAO. 2000. The State of the World’s Food Insecurity. Rome.  
50 DI 2007.  
51 Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. 2007. CRED CRUNCH 8: 1. 
http://www.emdat.be/Documents/CredCrunch/Cred%20Crunch%208.pdf
52 DI 2008.  
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Table 1. (continued) 
(11) (12) (13)  (14)  
Future risk of civil Global Peace Failed States MDG1 
conflict and  Index (inverse, Index (2007)53 progress54
instability55 (2007) 2008)56  (inverse) 
Afghanistan Iraq Sudan Venezuela 
Iraq Sudan Iraq Bolivia 
Niger Israel Somalia Yemen  
Ethiopia Russia Zimbabwe Colombia  
Liberia Nigeria Chad Niger  
Sierra Leone Colombia Cote d’Ivoire Burundi  
Mali Pakistan  DRC Cote d’Ivoire 
Tanzania Lebanon Afghanistan Laos 
C.A.R. Cote d’Ivoire Guinea Madagascar 
Djibouti Angola C.A.R Uzbekistan  
 
The other current preoccupation of food policy analysts is high world prices for food as well as 
fuel.  
As the Executive Director of WFP recently put it, “Record level food and fuel prices, increasing 
climate challenges and decreasing food stocks are coming together to hit the world’s most 
vulnerable—the so-called bottom billion—hard at a time when food aid flows are at their lowest 
levels for thirty-five years, and with the food surplus disposal era clearly over.” 57  
The cereal import bill for food-deficit countries in 2007–08 is forecast by FAO to rise by 35 
percent, while the Economic Intelligence Unit predicts an 11 percent rise in cereal prices in the 
next two years and a 5 percent increase in the price of oilseeds.58 Trying to limit the impact of 
rising cereal prices on domestic food consumption, many developing country governments are 
taking (or considering) a range of policy measures that include lowering import tariffs (Morocco, 
Benin), raising food subsidies (Egypt, Jordan), bringing key commodities under price control 
(Ukraine), and banning or imposing duties on basic food exports (Ethiopia).59  
Current high prices could be short lived, but some argue that the world may be facing a new era 
of higher and rising food prices—the jury is still out. The pressure on prices reflects a confluence 
of influences, including serious droughts affected output in several key producing countries in 
                                                 
53 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865&page=7
54 Negative progress toward MDG1 based on each country’s position in the base year of 1990. Source: U. Gentilini and P. 
Webb. 2008. Ibid. 
55 J. Hewitt et. al. 2007. Peace and Conflict 2008: Executive Summary. Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management, University of Maryland, MD. 
56 http://www.visionofhumanity.com/rankings/
57 J. Sheeran. 2008. Testimony to the European Parliament Development Committee, March 6. Brussels, Belgium. 
Mimeo. 
58 Economist Intelligence Unit. 2007. World commodity forecasts: Food feedstuffs and beverages. Main report, 4th 
Quarter 2007. 
www.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=displayIssueTOC&issue_id=1912762176&publication_id=440003244. 
59 FAO. 2008. Crop Prospects and Food Situation. No.1 (February). Rome.  
19 
the mid 2000s which led to two successive years of negative growth in world cereal 
production;60 low world cereal year-end stocks during recent years (levels below 20 percent of 
consumption needs usually trigger heightened concerns about the outlook for global production); 
increased demand globally for meat and dairy products, in part driven by high economic growth 
rates in China and India;61 and increased emphasis on bio-fuels. As FAO puts it, “what 
distinguishes the current state of agricultural markets is rather the concurrence of the hike in 
world prices of, not just a selected few, but of nearly all, major food and feed commodities.”62 
Given the multiplicity of factors involved long-term impacts remain unclear. On the one hand, it 
has been argued that by 2030 there will be 600 million more chronically undernourished people 
in the world due to continued pressure on prices, in large part due to the conversion of maize 
away from food uses to ethanol production.63 The International Food Policy Research Institute 
expects further increases in cereal prices of about 10 to 20 percent up to 2015 in current US 
dollars, and OECD and FAO see the price of coarse grains rising by 35 percent and that of 
oilseeds to increase by 13 percent by 2016–17.64 65  
On the other hand, price spikes are not rare in agricultural markets and high prices are 
historically short lived. For example, the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
estimates that higher maize demand and prices will last until 2009–10, and thereafter sees 
production growth to be on par with consumption growth.66 Indeed, trends since the 1960s show 
more food produced in absolute terms as well as in per capita terms, and declining real prices for 
that food (Figure 6). There have been spikes at various points (notably around 1973 and 1996), 
but technological change in agriculture, poverty reduction, higher labor productivity, and 
increased demand for food linked to urbanization and economic growth, combined to maintain 
downward pressure on food costs to consumers at the average global level.67 Indeed, while 
current “historically high” prices are high in nominal terms (higher than in 1996), but not in real 
(inflation adjusted) terms (Figure 7). 
                                                 
60 It is important to note that while talking of food security in a country like Nigeria, FEWSNET points out that price 
trends in parts of that country remain below average levels, on the one hand, and that high coarse grain prices were 
in fact expected in West Africa due to “poor production conditions”. In other words, increased prices need to be 
understood in relation to local market conditions, which includes taking already expected increases into account 
(i.e., the net effects of biofuels should be considered in relation to expected price rises linked to drought, pests, fuel 
costs and certain secular factors). USAID. 2008. West Africa Food Security Alert, February 4.  
61 Although, annual growth in cereal imports into Africa as a whole has also reached around 3.6 percent. See Jayne, 
T. 2007. Underappreciated Facts about African Agriculture. Seminar at the African Studies Center, Michigan State 
University, East Lancing, Michigan, September 13, 2007. 
62 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2007. Food Outlook: Global Market Analysis. Rome. 
63 Runge, F. and B. Senauer. 2007. How Biofuels Could Starve the Poor. Foreign Affairs. May/June.  
64 OECD-FAO. 2006. Agricultural Outlook 2006–2015. Paris.  
65 Von Braun, J. 2007. The World Food Situation: New Driving Forces and Required Actions. Washington, DC: 
International Food Policy Research Institute.  
66 Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute.2007. FAPRI 2007 US and world agricultural outlook. Ames, 
Iowa. 
67 Hazell, P. and S. Wood. 2008. Drivers of change in global agriculture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society. Series B, 363: 495–515. 
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Figure 6: Trends in Food Production and Prices, 1961–2006 
 
Source: Reproduced from P. Hazell and S. Wood. 2008. Drivers of change in global 
agriculture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. Series B, 363: 495–515. 
 
Figure 7: Nominal and Adjusted Wheat Prices, 1969–2008 
 
Source: Reproduced from D. Streitfeld. 2008. In Price and Supply, Wheat is the 
Unstable Staple. New York Times, February 13. 
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However, it is important to note that even in the best case (with a rapid return to the trend in 
declining global grain prices), first, there will still be a couple of years of hardship among net 
consumers in food importing low-income countries and households, and second, prices may 
stabilize at higher levels over the medium term. Both scenarios have implications for the 
immediate future since donors could respond in several different ways: they may consider that 
(1) given well-known counter-cycles between grain prices and food aid supplies, relatively more 
humanitarian aid should go to food aid (even if lower volumes will be possible), since cash 
transfers supporting food purchases could end up having less real value to beneficiaries in a time 
of rapid price increases; (2) more investment is needed for developing country agriculture; 
and/or (3) cash aid is a preferable form of humanitarian resource since the cost of delivering food 
is now untenable (due to very high fuel costs, not only the cost of commodities). Each of the 
above is possible, but the thrust of most donor reactions to this most recent food crisis are not yet 
clear.  
Summary  
The developing world is facing at least as many exogenous shocks as ever—in some locations 
more than before, and in some cases, more intense than before. While fewer people are dying in 
the context of humanitarian emergencies (an important, often overlooked bright spot), such 
success carries the corollary that many more people are affected if not killed. Many of those have 
seen their coping capacities eroded, with growing ill health, undernutrition and destitution laying 
many communities open to vagaries of climate, global market conditions, epidemic contagion 
and the traumas of contested ownership of natural and other resources. Many vulnerable people 
are shifting physically to urban slums where they face new health challenges despite continued, 
albeit different, exposure to natural disasters.  
The result is a growing pool of vulnerable states, characterized by fragile economies and by 
livelihoods pursued by economically and physiologically vulnerable people. There are few, if 
any, humanitarian crises that do not have multiple causes and synchronistic, cascading impacts—
what the Humanitarian Futures Programme calls: “interactive drivers, shocks and crisis 
agents.”68 The recent Niger tragedy, for instance, represented a complex interaction among 
drought, locust invasion, market price hikes, governance failure, and pre-existing high levels 
severe acute malnutrition. Similarly, current threats to life in the DRC reflect a compounding of 
epidemic diseases, traumas associated with population displacements, pre-existing chronic 
undernourishment and the direct dangers posed by armed conflict among multiple interest 
groups. The humanitarian and development communities (donors, operational agencies and 
national governments), can no longer afford to treat any shocks (temporal hazards or longer-run 
conflicts) as quasi independent drivers of food crises. Protection of rural livelihoods in fragile 
environments is complex, taking account of the multiple risks that frame producer investments 
and consumer decision-making over the longer-run—not simply responding to the shock that just 
happened. Success is possible—measured in terms of lessons well-learned on how to save lives, 
regions becoming more stable, and whole countries gradually moving towards sustained and 
integrated social and economic growth. Faster and wider replication of the innovative thinking 
and action underpinning such successes is a priority for the coming decades.  
                                                 
68 Humanitarian Future Programme, King’s College London. 2007. Dimensions of Crisis Impacts: Humanitarian 
Needs by 2015. Report prepared for the Department for International Development. London. 
22 
PART 2. EFFECTIVENESS OF  
THE HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM  
IN ADDRESSING FOOD INSECURITY 
2.1. Views on Humanitarian Effectiveness: What Is the Problem? 
There have been numerous critiques of the humanitarian food security enterprise in recent years. 
To put these in perspective and address the question of the effectiveness of he humanitarian 
system in addressing food insecurity, this Section reviews these critiques, and quickly reviews 
the causes of food security crises and the analytical problems in understanding them, before 
analyzing contemporary food security interventions and the architecture of the food security 
“endeavor” to implement these interventions, and the reforms underway to improve the capacity 
and coordination of various actors. The section ends with a summary of issues determining how 
effective the collective effort has been. 
Critiques of Humanitarian Action 
Recent criticisms center around analytical capacity (assessments of need, cost-effectiveness, 
impact); the ability to allocate resources impartially; the ability to link analysis or early warning 
to a timely and appropriate response; balanced responses to food security crises and the 
engagement of humanitarian food security actors at the policy level; and limited ability to link 
the short-term protection of food consumption with long-term improvements in production and 
access. 
From a humanitarian perspective, there is an additional problem—not necessarily growing out of 
these critiques—around the definition of effectiveness or “success.” It is quite clear what 
constitutes failure in humanitarian terms: the loss of human lives, the crippling impact of 
malnutrition, and the destruction of livelihoods. But “success” isn’t simply the opposite of 
failure; because failure has a clear end point, but success does not. For example, the 
humanitarian effort in Darfur in 2005–06 was deemed relatively successful because it managed 
to contain the malnutrition and mortality crisis in camps for displaced people, bringing under-
five acute malnutrition for the most part down below 15 percent prevalence. Yet, in 2007 this 
“success” evaporated, under the splintering of opposition movements and the breakdown of 
humanitarian access and security. The result was continued crisis, simmering and periodically 
flaring to this day. Similarly, the robust response to the Ethiopian crisis of 2002–03 was 
generally considered “successful” in the sense of a major crisis averted, but on the back end of 
that crisis the number of people requiring food assistance every year—good rains or bad—
jumped from 3–4 million per year to 7–8 million people per year.69 The result is that food 
security in Ethiopia has not improved in vulnerable regions despite “successful” emergency 
response several years earlier. So how does the humanitarian food security community define 
“success?” It may be partial, fleeting, and disconnected—none of which are usual components of 
a definition of success. 
                                                 
69 At the end of 2007 it was reported that “8 million people face chronic food insecurity…while an additional 1.3 
million are in need of emergency food assistance.” UN/SCN. 2007. Nutrition in Crisis Situations. Report XV, p. 3.  
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Specific Critiques 
Analytical Capacity. In 2004, Levine and Chastre70 reviewed emergency food security 
interventions in Central Africa and pointed out that most of the emergency food security 
programs they reviewed:  
1. Actually failed to address needs as defined in any sense by intended beneficiary population;  
2. Were not based on analysis and therefore were not even designed to address needs;  
3. Were not well thought through but were based on a relatively narrow range of pre-existing 
packages—largely food aid and agricultural inputs; and 
4. In many cases, information from previous assessments or from other organizations was 
ignored, even when it existed.  
Impartiality. The imperative for analysis to enable an appropriate, impartial, and proportional 
response was brought back to the food security and humanitarian communities four years ago by 
a landmark HPG study, According to Need.71 That report had three crucial points:  
1. International humanitarian financing is not allocated proportional to need across crises; 
funding allocated does not reflect comparative levels of need. 
2. There is no system-wide framework for judging the relative severity of crises and for 
aligning response accordingly. 
3. Donors are often skeptical about individual agency assessments of need. Agencies on the 
other hand, doubt that objective assessment is the basis on which donors actually make 
allocations anyway (related to the first point above). 
Donors may want random sampling used in assessments while agencies might prefer to sample 
purposively, and in ways that allow then not only to link nutrition info to food security 
information that can help in quickly tailoring and targeting responses. These reflect different 
ideas of what information is needed in terms of assessing “need,” rather than a clear divide 
between a right way and a wrong way. The HPG report included, though was not limited to, 
humanitarian food security responses. These criticisms had been made regarding humanitarian 
response previously.  
Linking Analysis to Action. This is often called “linking early warning to early response.”72 But 
the analytical constraints are broader than just early warning, and the action constraints include 
more than just on-the-ground, programmatic responses. A recent critique of early warning and 
response in slow-onset disasters in the Sahel and elsewhere in Africa refers to the “institutional 
production of partial success.” This critique sharply criticizes the notion that better famine early 
warning data will, “in any simple way, translate into faster, better, more targeted and effective 
response.” 73 The point of the critique is that food security information systems exist first and 
                                                 
70 Simon Levine and Claire Chastre et al. 2004. Missing the Point: An Analysis of Food Security Interventions in the 
Great Lakes. Network Paper 47, Humanitarian Practice Network. London: Overseas Development Institute.  
71 James Darcy and Charles-Antoine Hofmann. 2003. According to Need? Needs Assessment and Decision-Making 
in the Humanitarian Sector. Humanitarian Policy Group Report #15. London: Overseas Development Institute.  
72 From the title of a book by the same name: Margaret Buchanan-Smith and Susanna Davies. 1995. Famine Early 
Warning and Response: The Missing Link. London: Intermediate Technology Publications. 
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foremost to service the needs of responders (governments and humanitarian agencies), not 
affected communities. As a result, they do produce a response that does save lives and 
livelihoods, but can necessarily only spring into action after some lives have been lost and some 
livelihoods destroyed. While there is no emergent consensus around this critique, it is difficult to 
argue with the evidence in the two most recent, large-scale, “slow-onset” crises in Africa (Niger 
in 2005 and the Greater Horn “Mandera Triangle” in 2005–06).74 Figure 8 depicts the response 
time frame to the latter crisis.75 It is clear to see the lost opportunity to protect lives and 
livelihoods, even though in this particular case, it can only be said that good early warning 
analysis existed.  
Figure 8: Timeline of Key Events in Greater Horn of Africa Drought Crisis, 2005–06 
 
 
Food Aid-Dominated Responses. Food aid has long been the dominant response to food 
insecurity in emergency contexts, and looks set to continue to be the predominant resource made 
available by the world’s largest donor, the USA. Not only has the “food aid traditionally been the 
largest single category of response, it has also been proportionately among the best funded.76 
With the rising cost of food grains and especially the rising cost of transportation, past trends are 
already changing—the availability of food aid in all categories (including humanitarian 
response) fell markedly between 2003 and June 2007 (the most recent period for which data are 
available).77 While cash programming increased dramatically in the same period, much of this 
was driven by the unique public response to the tsunami, and may or may not represent a long-
term trend. 
                                                 
74 There is some controversy, in light of various recent crises including the two mentioned here—as well as the 
Ethiopia crisis of 2002–2003—as to whether the term “slow-onset” is very useful any longer. While true that 
drought (usually thought of as a slow process) was part of the causation, all these crises are clear examples of 
multiple hazards overlaid on chronic poverty. Unlike, for example, the Sahelian drought in the 1970s, the 
humanitarian crisis hit very rapidly in these cases.  
75 Humanitarian Policy Group. 2006. “Saving lives through saving livelihoods: critical gaps in the response to the 
drought in the Greater Horn of Africa.” HPG Briefing Note. London: ODI.
76 See OCHA CAP Appeals for various years. Today, the food sector is no longer automatically the largest share of 
total humanitarian appeals or funding—being displaced by funds to multisectoral or non-allocated activities.  
77 WFP Interfais data base. 
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Limited Engagement at the Policy Level. Several recent studies—again, including but not 
limited to, food security crises—have made it clear that the voice of humanitarian actors is of 
limited influence in determining the nature or the scale of the response to a humanitarian crisis.78 
This is likely in part because humanitarian actors are by nature more oriented to field action than 
the more painstaking work of policy advocacy. But it also reflects the influence of the media and 
the geo-political interests of donors. Given the growing presence of private, for-profit and 
military actors in humanitarian response, and the increasing subordination of humanitarian 
interventions to strategic or security objectives, the demand for humanitarian actors of all sectors 
to devote more attention to the policy realm may grow. 
Limited Ability to Link Short-Term to Long-Term Interventions. This is the topic of an entire 
later section of this paper, but in brief, the critique is that while short-term efforts have protected 
lives in many humanitarian operations, the necessary commitment and infrastructure has not 
been present to support long-term improvement, not has short-term intervention been appropriate 
either in many cases—based on an inadequate understanding of livelihood systems and contexts. 
In many cases, cycles of drought and other causal factors have shortened, offering less and less 
“recovery” time between major crises. Agencies, often hobbled by their reliance on differing 
donor rules, often have unclear exit strategies or transition strategies from humanitarian 
operations.79 While defining a “boundary” is clearly not a good way to deal with this problem, 
some more nuanced understanding about linkages is clearly needed. 
Successes and Challenges 
While the list of criticisms is lengthy, some progress is being made in addressing these 
criticisms. 
Analysis. A major effort led by WFP funded by various donors—the SENAC project80—is 
working to improve assessment and analysis capacity, the credibility of findings and the 
transparency of recommendations. Other ongoing efforts to improve analysis include the 
SMART initiative and the Humanitarian Benchmarking initiative.  
Impartiality. There has been considerable work done to validate individual indicators and their 
comparability across different contexts. The Food and Agriculture Organization is leading the 
development and application of the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase 
Classification—a tool specifically designed to incorporate different kinds of information into an 
overall analytical framework that permits the impartial comparison of different crises and 
different contexts. Though not yet fully operational outside the Horn of Africa, it has already 
been effective in unifying the language used across sectors—improving both in situ analysis and 
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comparability. Other systemic means of putting indicator information together include the Needs 
Assessment Framework proposed by OCHA.  
Diversifying Response. Given both the questions about the impact of food aid, and the increasing 
cost of procuring and shipping food, donors, governments and agencies alike are beginning to 
consider and offer alternatives to food aid. Several observers have noted lately that there is now 
the risk of recreating the same kind of “automatic” response about cash that developed around 
food aid, without a clear body of empirical evidence to help determine whether cash, food, or 
some other input is the most effective resource to enhance food security in the context of 
crises.81 Other kinds of response include more emphasis on the market and private sector actors, 
and more robust response at the policy level.  
Response Analysis. In addition to improving contextual analysis, humanitarian actors are 
beginning to think of how to evaluation different responses to needs and their expected impact—
a practice coming to be called “response analysis.” WFP, CARE and Oxfam are all working on 
market analysis tools aimed at honing the choice between cash and food, based not only on need, 
but on market impacts.  
Improved Policy Engagement. Some of the inter-agency initiatives of recent years have resulted 
in a much stronger role for humanitarian NGOs in the whole CAP process. Major donors are 
talking to each other more, thanks in part to PRSP processes and the outcomes of the “Delivering 
as One” report, and the Good Humanitarian Donorship process (discussed in greater details 
below). 
Summary 
To summarize, humanitarian food security programs have often been based on little analysis or 
poor analysis. This is improving, and there are serious efforts to improve analysis, to improve the 
ability to compare across contexts, and to improve the link between analysis and action. But 
there has been a question of trust between humanitarian actors and donors. And despite 
improvements in various areas, there have recently been renewed criticisms that humanitarian 
agencies aren’t very good at learning from their own mistakes.82
Several questions arise: 
1. Can the humanitarian food security “community” improve its analyses to reflect changing 
realities on the ground, enable impartial responses, improves timeliness and measurable 
impact?  
2. How can this analysis be better linked in practical way to better interventions, adequate and 
balanced resourcing, and improved engagement at the policy level?  
3. Can humanitarian actors improve the linkage between their actions in the field, and the 
programs, policies and institutional requirements for sustainable, long-term improvements in 
food security?  
                                                 
81 John Hoddinott. 2006. “A conceptual framework for appropriate emergency response options.” FCND Discussion 
Paper. Washington: IFPRI. Phillip Whyte, personal communication, 2007. 
82 See for example Thomas Weiss and Peter Hoffman. 2007. “The Fog of Humanitarianism: Collective Action 
Problems and Learning-Challenged Organizations.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1(1): 47–65. 
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2.2. Overview of Food Security Crises  
To effectively address the proximate, intermediate, and underlying causes of food security during 
an emergency, a complete understanding of the various forces at play is crucial. As chronic food 
insecurity often transitions to a “food crisis” or “food emergency” during/after periods of shock, 
both the chronic causes and immediate manifestations of the crisis must be understood and 
addressed simultaneously. Clearly discerning the true causes and impacts of a crisis can be 
difficult, though, as natural and human forces and chronic and immediate symptoms of food 
insecurity are often multiple and intertwined.83  
Despite the various causes of food crises, the hardships that individuals face can bear striking 
similarities even across disparate settings. The inability to afford food, sale of productive assets, 
migration of household members in search of work, and the lack adequate caloric intake have all 
been widely documented as symptoms of food crises. In areas where populations experience 
chronic vulnerability, the likelihood of experiencing a food security crisis is much larger. 
Causes  
The natural causes of acute food insecurity are numerous: drought, flood, cyclone, tsunami, and 
earthquake. In rural areas, these events often cripple the assets (including natural and physical 
assets such as land and livestock, but also social and human assets as well) of already vulnerable 
households. Vulnerability and food insecurity increase when purchasing power at the household 
level is reduced, due to either decreased income or higher food prices. Urban and peri-urban 
areas are similarly impacted, as natural causes can lead to increased (temporarily or sustained) 
higher food prices, food shortages, epidemics, and sudden settlement of those displaced by the 
shock. To make matters worse, natural causes of food crises are often cyclical, repeatedly 
affecting the same regions or agro-climatic zones.  
Niger’s 2005 food crisis illustrates how the occurrence of natural hazards (drought and locust 
infestation) and economic shocks, on top of conditions of chronic food insecurity can quickly 
lead to large-scale loss of human life.84 Before the drought and subsequent locust plague in 2004, 
the Niger was ranked 176 out of 177 countries by UNDP’s 2004 Human Development Index 
(HDI), with an average life expectancy of forty-six years and only 17.1 percent adult literacy 
rate.85 Despite this poor outlook, Niger was making modest strides to improve its citizens’ 
wellbeing prior to the food crisis, reducing its “child mortality rate by more than 5 percent”86. 
Any progress made prior to the crisis was quickly shattered, however, as some 800 thousand 
children became vulnerable as a result of the crisis, with 160 thousand and 36 thousand children 
suffering from moderate and severe wasting, respectively.87 This example represents the dual 
hindrance that crises pose, not only do they divert limited resources away from development to 
relief, their impact can readily quash any progress made up to that point.  
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In addition to natural causes, food crises can also have human causes, such as conflict, climate 
change, market collapse, governance failures, land and natural resource degradation, population 
growth, and HIV/AIDS.88 89 The human causes can either jointly spur a food crisis with can 
natural hazards or initiate a crisis independent of natural events. Zimbabwe offers a clear 
example of the coalescence of natural and human causes of a food crisis. According to 
FEWSNet, “…drought, hyperinflation, price controls, fuel shortages, and economic collapse 
underlie Zimbabwe’s worsening food crisis.” 90 Furthermore, Zimbabwe’s ability to produce 
sufficient food stuffs for its population in the future is hampered by a “combination of drought, 
lack of irrigation, seeds and other inputs, [and] spare parts for machinery.” 91 Zimbabwe’s 2006–
07 harvest produced only 45 percent of its cereal needs, with the remainder coming from relief 
food aid and imports from neighboring Malawi. Between October 2007 and March 2008, 
FEWSNet estimates “approximately 4.1 million people in rural and urban areas are expected to 
need emergency assistance.” 92 Though historically Zimbabwe has been largely successful in 
attaining the needed food supplies, the widespread deterioration of macroeconomic conditions 
(largely caused by government policies and price controls) all but ensure that vulnerability and 
insecurity of millions of Zimbabweans will persist.  
Often the most devastating—and long-lasting—crises in recent memory have been caused 
largely by conflict or complex emergencies. Violence and displacement was the single biggest 
cause of the mortality and malnutrition crisis in Darfur in 2004 and 2005 (and probably again at 
the present, although the data is not yet available). The destruction of markets, health 
infrastructure and civil institutions led to the malnutrition and disease that caused over 90 percent 
of the estimated 5.4 million deaths in the civil war in the Congo.93 While once distinguished by 
neat categorizations, the causes of food security crises are becoming increasingly intertwined. 
Reference has already been made to the impact of climate change on land-use and ownership, 
and its subsequent contributions to the conflict in Darfur. The linkages between climate change, 
“natural” disasters, political causes, and violent conflict are now better recognized.94  
Slow versus Rapid Onset  
Though the causes of food crises are of great importance, the onset (slow versus rapid) can also 
greatly impact the “character” of a crisis. Droughts are classically recognized as a cause of slow-
onset crises, since they must occur over a growing season and since food stockpiles must be 
depleted before deprivation sets in. Due to their nature, slow-onset crisis can be readily 
monitored, predicted, and ideally prevented. But even “slow onset” crises can quickly get out of 
hand. Niger’s 2005 food crisis clearly illustrates that identification of slow-onset crisis does not 
ensure that it will be prevented. The World Food Programme approached the international donor 
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community initially in November 2004 and again in May 2005 with minimal response, even 
though the WFP estimated that “3.6 million [were] in critical need of food aid” 95 Though the 
crisis was foreseen, the lack of response from the donor allowed Niger to slip into crisis. By July 
2005, funding needs had increased exponentially as the situation had grown more severe. At this 
time, “UN under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator, 
says it would have cost $1 a day to prevent malnutrition among children [in Niger] if the world 
had responded immediately. Now it will cost $80 to save a malnourished child’s life.” 96 This 
example underscores the need for governments, international institutions, and the donor 
community to respond accordingly to predicted crisis. Though early-warning systems succeeded 
in alerting the humanitarian community to the problem, these systems from did not prevent it 
from becoming a crisis. And whereas for example, the drought-triggered crisis in the Sahel in the 
1970s developed over a period of years, recent crises (Niger 2005, Greater Horn of Africa 2005–
06, or Ethiopia 2002–03) have developed quite quickly—causing the “slow onset” label to be 
misleading. 
As its name suggests, a rapid-onset crisis has disparate characteristics to its “slow” counterpart. 
Common rapid-onset crisis include “cyclones, earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis…many floods 
[and] disease epidemics or violence.” 97 These disasters occur suddenly without warning, often 
causing widespread physical damage and human causalities. Rapid-onset emergencies do not 
always lead to protracted food crisis, especially if their impact is localized, duration short, and a 
comprehensive safety net system is in place. The 2005 Pakistan earthquake demonstrates how 
sufficient government capacity and timely response prevented a protracted crisis. According to 
Barrett, even in the most food insecure provinces of Northwest Frontier Province and Azad 
Jammu Kashmir, “food remained readily available…with minimal if any effects on local prices, 
production incentives or urban residents outside the immediate impact zone.” 98 When technical 
capacity and a timely response is missing however, the risk that such a disaster triggers a food 
crisis increases. The recent crisis from the disputed elections in Kenya show how rapid-onset 
emergencies lead to increased food insecurity and can potentially lead to longer-term food crisis. 
Thus far, the conflict has left more than 200 thousand people displaced. Residing primarily in 
IDP camps, these displaced persons have lost their land and livelihood, putting them at greatest 
risk if acute food security. In addition, FEWSNet notes that “food insecurity has increased 
significantly as the impacts of the conflict deepen across most livelihoods. The epicenter of the 
conflict is the Rift Valley Province, the most important agricultural area of the country 
[which]…account[s] for close to 50 percent of all cereal produced in the country annually.” 99 
Though this conflict is still nascent and reconciliation looks optimistic, it is easy to see how a 
rapid-onset emergency has displaced large numbers and hampered the agricultural capacity of 
Kenya at the same time.  
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Small versus Large Scale 
Though seemingly straight forward, the concept of the scale of a food crisis contains numerous 
nuances. First, it important to note that responses to food crises or disasters are often based less 
on scale of damage than political will and donor empathy. The 2004 Asian Tsunami offers a 
unique example, where the scale of the event (approximately 300 thousand deaths, 1.7 million 
people displaced, and $10 billion in damages) was surpassed by the response ($15.5 billion 
contributed globally).100 This massive outpouring of support enabled both a timely and 
comprehensive response across numerous countries by multiple agencies. Secondly, scale (either 
small or large) should not necessarily be confused for concentration of need. Though some crises 
are localized, such as the recent flooding in Uganda, others, such as the 2002 Ethiopian food 
crisis,101 are more diffuse.  
In addition to crises caused by exogenous shocks such as drought or conflict, the cumulative 
effects of idiosyncratic shocks have been recently identified as substantial contributors to 
widespread food crises. Though idiosyncratic shocks can take many forms, the linkage between 
HIV/Aids and acute food insecurity has been of particular concern due to its large impact on 
livelihoods and national capacity.102 The global impact of HIV/Aids is staggering. “In 2005 an 
estimated 2.8 million people died of AIDS, 380,000 of them children. In the same year, an 
estimated 2.3 million children remained living with the HIV virus, and an estimated 15 million 
AIDS orphans face serious threats to their food security, access to healthcare and education, 
greatly increasing their risk of malnutrition.”103  
2.3. Innovations in Food Security Analysis 
The dearth, until recently, of scientifically validated and practical household food security 
measures has hampered the assessment of effectiveness in emergency food security 
interventions. While methods for tracking the delivery of services are relatively straightforward, 
conventional food security impact indicators, like caloric adequacy, are cost prohibitive or 
generally not feasible to collect under crisis conditions. Different analytical frameworks have 
been developed by different agencies—too many to elaborate here. Much of food security 
analysis has moved beyond just looking at availability or access, is now grounded in a solid 
understanding of livelihoods, and increasingly takes into the role of markets, and in some cases 
conflict analysis and climate change. The advancements in food security measurement over the 
last several years means that agencies participating in emergency food security programming 
can, and must, increase efforts to assess program impact for purposes of learning and 
accountability. That said, there are still challenges that need to be tackled to improve the 
confidence with which such indicators can be used, not just for impact assessment but for a range 
of purposes including targeting and monitoring shifts in the problem over time.  
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Comparability for Impartiality in Response 
A major challenge to food security analysis is the comparability from one location to another. 
The influential report already referred to above, According to Need?104 highlighted for the 
humanitarian community how far short it was falling of the demand for impartiality in response 
to crises. Impartiality in response requires the capacity to make comparisons across very 
different contexts so as to be able to allocate resources according to real comparisons of need. In 
this area, some progress has been made. The Integrated Phase Classification tool105 has 
developed a “common currency” in food security analysis. The IPC combines a number of 
indicators into a comparative framework to rank the status of a population in a given geographic 
area/livelihood zone and compare the status of different groups in crisis, to provide a situation 
analysis of the severity and causes of a crisis, to map out trends in an early warning analysis, and 
to link these to a strategic response framework. The net effect has been to systematize situation 
analysis and make it comparable across different crises. Despite some acknowledged 
shortcomings, the IPC is now recognized as the best means the food security community now has 
to address the issue of impartial allocation of resources.106  
Linking Analysis to Decision Making 
However, improved analysis by itself has not always improved programming. Instruments like 
baseline poverty and vulnerability assessments, comprehensive early warning systems, and 
emergency food security assessments are designed to inform a range of program information 
needs. These needs include (1) baseline knowledge of the magnitude, type, and geographic 
dispersion of food insecurity, (2) the sources and nature of risks and the populations vulnerable 
to them, (3) underlying causes, (4) trend analysis (what, where and how is the problem 
developing?) and, in the case of a declared emergency, (5) the dimensions of the problem, (6) 
predictions who is most effected, (7) determination of the most appropriate response.107  
There have been great strides in systematizing the approach to carrying these assessments and to 
routinizing the type of data that are collected. A substantive contribution to this effort has been 
made by WFP’s Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment (SENAC) project, which has 
concentrated its work on (1) accountability and transparency, (2) methods and guidance, (3) pre-
crisis information, and (4) assessment capacities.108  
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A review of WFP practice by ODI (which is symptomatic of the larger food security community) 
examining “Linkages between ENAs and decision-making” concluded that, while assessments 
are well-used to inform their own programming decisions, they are not as useful for donors or 
other partners in facilitating their decision-making.109 In addition, they continue to be narrowly 
focused on an a priori assumption of food aid programming rather than providing a basis on 
which to inform the broader range of response options (ODI/SENAC 2007). On-going work by 
WFP undertaken as part of its Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment (SENAC) project 
has made some progress in broadening the range of response options considered. This issue is 
not unique to WFP, and as organizations recognize the need to better tailor their response to the 
context, improving the response analysis will be critical. A challenge is to broaden response 
analysis beyond the programs’ inception through careful monitoring and re-analysis throughout 
so that necessary programmatic adjustments can be made. This issue is exemplified by the 
response analysis required to make decisions about cash versus food programming. The choice 
requires careful assessment and then ongoing monitoring of markets to determine whether cash 
injections are having inflationary effects and to adjust the intervention accordingly if they are. 
In summary, food security analysis has improved, both in its tools and its approaches, but some 
problems remain and as noted above, while improved analysis helps, on its own, it will not 
address the chronic problem of late or inadequate responses, or responses based on something 
other than the humanitarian imperative. 
2.4 Overview of Food Security Interventions 
Seeking to deal with underlying, multiple causes of food insecurity in the context of 
humanitarian action is not new. The ideal of weaving effective relief with sustained 
developmental outcomes, while knitting crisis-dedicated resources with long-run policy and 
programs, goes back many decades.110 It is widely understood that saving lives (through health, 
nutrition and other relief interventions) should be as timely and effective as possible, but also 
that they be complemented by interventions that seek to save livelihoods (and ideally enhance 
both lives and livelihoods to levels that exceeded those prior to the crisis). That is, actions 
undertaken in emergencies must meet current needs, but also try to tackle pre-existing problems. 
In this sense, humanitarian action includes a wide range of goals, including: 
1. Meeting (closing the gap in) minimum current food and non-food consumption needs 
2. Stabilizing consumption into the medium term 
3. Laying the ground for enhanced future consumption in terms of quality, not only quantity 
4. Repairing or replacing the local stock of damaged/lost productive assets 
5. Enhancing the productivity of current assets 
6. Repairing or enhancing impaired income streams (which may involved enhancing human 
capital to achieve higher labor productivity) 
7. Make diversification of future income streams more feasible 
8. Help buffer assets and income from a range of potential future hazards 
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This is a large and challenging agenda that requires many kinds of intervention to succeed. The 
problem is that while “relief actions that strengthen livelihoods”111 has become a rallying cry 
across the humanitarian community, there remains uncertainty about what actions are 
appropriate, cost-effective and programmatically coherent in relation to all other potential 
actions. OCHA recently noted that potential donors to humanitarian appeals can be confused by 
a “lengthy catalogues of undifferentiated projects, with no clear prioritization.” 112 For example, 
the 2008 Flash Appeal for Southern Africa (the Preparedness and Response Plan cost $89 
million), lists activities with titles like “enhancing food and nutrition security” ($386,403 
requested by a UN agency and “early recovery for vulnerable households” ($55 thousand 
appealed for by an INGO) within the Agriculture sector, while an international inter-
governmental body requests $730 thousand for “livelihoods revitalization for food-affected 
households” as part of the Economic Recovery and Infrastructure sector. Similarly, the 2008 
CAP for DRC has projects like “reducing global acute malnutrition to less than10 percent and 
severe acute malnutrition to less than 2 percent” under the heading of Agriculture, and identical 
activities listed under the Food sector as well as under Health. And the Somalia 2008 CAP calls 
for “integrated nutrition and food security programming” ($98 thousand requested by a small 
INGO) as an activity in the lower Juba region classified as a health sector intervention, while 
another, much larger, INGO requests $4.1 million for a “rural food security program” under the 
rubric of the food sector, and yet another requests $625 thousand for a “household food security 
project” under the heading of agriculture.  
Of course, project titles are mere place-holders for what are often complex, multifaceted 
activities. In many ways, it is encouraging that there is a growing attention in CAP and Flash 
Appeals (and beyond) to food security and livelihoods issues, that they are found in multiple 
sectors (not restricted to “agriculture”), that many more agencies are seeking to engage directly 
in food security interventions, and that there is increasing innovation apparent in the 
interventions concerned. For example, activities list in the 1995 CAP for Somalia listed 
conventional activities such as “provision of agricultural inputs” and “provision of fishing gear 
to fishermen.” By 2001, Somalia’s CAP still included familiar activities like “provision of cereal 
seeds and agricultural tools,” and “river embankment rehabilitation”, but there was evidence of 
novel thinking that broadened the range of activities. As of 2008, the CAP for Somalia includes 
funding requests for projects focused on “restocking pack camels to poor pastoral families,” 
“poverty eradication through chicken rearing,” and “strengthening community capacity to cope 
with future shocks.”  
Going beyond Somalia, recent appeals have included activities like “Seed Fairs and Cash for 
Work for Livelihoods” in Burundi (in 2007), support for “provision of vitamins for livestock in 
areas affected by floods” in Bolivia, and promotion of “livelihood and food sufficiency” in 
conflict-affected areas of the Philippines, which involved a program of training in “gender and 
peace impact assessment, good environmental practices, and participatory data gathering” for 
101 volunteers. Outside of CAPs, there are also interventions such the British Red Cross 
                                                 
111 GHD (Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative). 2007. Good Humanitarian Donorship and Disaster Risk 
Reduction: A Concept Paper, July. Mimeo.  
112 OCHA. 2008. Consolidated Appeals 2008. New York.  
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Society’s flat-rate distribution of cash grants to households impacted by the Tsunami,113 and 
even the World Bank’s “Emergency Program for Poverty Reduction” initiated in Togo, which 
seeks to contribute to poverty reduction in poor communities by improving social services 
delivery.114
In other words, there has recently been growing recognition of need for innovation in both relief 
responses and food security programming in the context of emergencies. However, the 
innovation and the scale of such responses both continue to be hampered by (1) a lack of 
dedicated resources, (2) limited interface between humanitarian food security interventions and 
post-crisis activities, and (3) all too scarce attention to risk reduction through such interventions 
to protect again future shocks.  
Constraints to Food Security Programming in Emergencies 
Resources. There has been a strong upward trend during recent years in both the volume and the 
share of ODA, although total DAC fell by 4.5 percent in 2006 (the latest year for which data are 
available) to just over $104 billion—the first fall in ODA real terms in over a decade.115 This has 
happened despite many commitments to higher and more sustained levels of aid made at 
numerous high-level political gatherings over the past five years (including the Monterrey, 
Gleneagles and the Millennium +5 meetings).116 While the decline was to some extent expected, 
since 2005 had seen unusually large flows due to debt relief operations (for Iraq and Nigeria) as 
well as humanitarian response to the Asian tsunami, it means that the annual increase in ODA 
from OECD countries will have to be very large indeed if they are to meet such targets two years 
from now (12 percent growth in ODA per annum versus the actual 5 percent yearly growth of 
recent years). This has important implications for the choice of countries and operations.  
The Good Humanitarian Donorship concept paper of July 2007 argues that, “we should target the 
most vulnerable, focusing on vulnerable, high-risk groups…in the most disaster-prone and 
poorest regions of the world.” 117 This is not happening in terms of overall ODA. In fact, the 
share of ODA going to least developed countries (LDCs) in 2006 remained low at only 28 
percent of all flows.118 The main beneficiaries of ODA during 2006 were countries with very 
high geopolitical significance to a few donors (Iraq and Afghanistan), and large stable economies 
                                                 
113 US$1,000 per household, based on the assumption that the tsunami affected rich and poor alike. L. Adams and P. 
Harvey. 2006. Livelihoods recovery: Learning from cash responses to the tsunami. Issue Paper 5. Humanitarian 
Policy Group. London: Overseas Development Institute.  
114 The latter project raises questions about the justification for certain activities under the rubric of “emergency” 
action. Since Togo is in arrears to the World Bank, this kind of grant was the only form of World Bank-sourced 
funding available to the country. Whether it truly represents an emergency-related activity versus a “quick 
disbursal” project to a poor country is open to debate. The question is, are donors comfortable with generic poverty 
alleviation activities being funded through humanitarian resource windows, when humanitarian resources are 
scarce? (see World Bank. 2007. Post-Conflict Fund and Licus Trust Fund: Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2007. 
Washington, DC) 
115 Development Assistance Committee. 2007. Final ODA Flows in 2006. Report to the DAC senior level meeting, 11–
12 December. Report DCD/|DAC/RD (2007)15/RD2. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
116 These meetings generated agreements to boost ODA by $50 billion (in real terms) by 2010, including a doubling 
of ODA flows to Africa.  
117 GHD. 2007, p. 3. 
118 OECD/DAC. 2006 data.  
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like Nigeria China Indonesia, India and Vietnam. These seven countries alone accounted for 
almost one third of global ODA flows (from all donors to all recipients).  
It can be argued that “special” relations between certain donors and beneficiaries play a large 
part in this pattern. For example, the main recipients of ODA from the United States (the single 
largest donor) were Iraq and Afghanistan; the UK’s principal beneficiaries were Nigeria and 
India (among the largest of its former colonies and important trade and political partners), and 
Iraq and Afghanistan.119 The main recipients of the European Commission’s ODA were Turkey, 
an aspiring entrant to the European Union, and Morocco (a key partner in the Mediterranean 
sphere). The top recipient of Belgium’s ODA in 2005–06 was a former colonial interest—the 
Democratic Republic of Congo—just as it had been in 1985–86. In 2005–06, Greece sent most 
of its ODA to near neighbors (the Balkans and Turkey).  
Since the definition of “humanitarian aid” continues to evolve, some categories are contested, 
such as the amount a donor allocates to caring for and educating refugees in its own country (as 
much as 25 percent of total humanitarian assistance reported by OECD members in 2004), 
certain military expenditure spent in the name of “peace keeping,” and debt relief. For example, 
total ODA increased by 31 percent between 2004 and 2005, but the bulk of that (almost 22 
percent) was accounted for by debt relief to just two countries—Nigeria and Iraq. There has 
recently been a tightening of the definition, but there is more to be done.120
Where emergency aid (within ODA) is concerned, humanitarian assistance (HA) has increased 
substantially in recent years, rising from under US$5 billion in 1995 (in constant 2005 dollars) to 
more than $9 billion in 2005 (the tsunami year).121 In 2006 (the latest period for which data are 
available) levels were still high, at around $8.5 billion.122 The growth reflects, i) an increased 
size of CAP appeals—the average annual CAP in the 2002 to 2007 period was $4.9 billion, 
compared with an annual average of $2.7 billion in the 5 year period before that; and ii) a 
growing share of ODA allocated to appeal responses—in 1984–85 support for humanitarian 
work accounted for less than 2 percent of total ODA but by 2005–06 it represented 7.5 percent of 
a (much larger) pie.  
That said, humanitarian aid is similarly dominated by a small number of recipients. In 2004, just 
three countries/crises accounted for one third of total humanitarian assistance flows (Iraq, Sudan 
                                                 
119 The US remains the single largest national government funder of humanitarian action (33 percent of total in 
2006), but the European Union (the EC plus its individual member states) has become the largest overall donor (42 
percent of global humanitarian assistance). This has some implications on the kinds of aid available and ultimately 
on priority recipients, given the US’ reliance on food in-kind and focus on large geopolitically-significant crises, 
versus the EU’s relatively greater reliance on non-food resources and traditional leaning towards former colonial 
partners.  
120 Russia’s recent write-off of US$12 billion of Iraqi debt will likely factor into the 2008 ODA reporting, but that 
was done in return for access by Russian companies (including oil giant Lukoil) to Iraqi natural resources. Should 
that count as ODA or instead as a form of private sector flow? 
121 Only part of global humanitarian assistance is reported through the OECD/DAC process. Some organizations, 
such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, some NGOs and private donations by the general 
public are not usually included in these numbers—nor are the resources spent by national governments and affected 
citiziens for the succor of others.  
122 The 2006 level represents a 70 percent increase over 1995. Source: Development Initiatives (DI) data on global 
humanitarian assistance, various years.  
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and Palestine) with six countries taking more than 50 percent of the total (GHA 2006). By 2006, 
the situation had changed only little. Indeed, four countries have featured in the top ten of 
recipients of humanitarian aid every year since 1995; namely, Sudan, DRC and DPRK. A few 
other countries also make frequent appearances in that list, including Somalia and Angola. In 
addition, large, media-worthy events continue to dominate the funding response patterns (like the 
Bangladesh cyclone Sidr), accounting in 2007 for more than a quarter of the annual total of 
resources for natural disasters under the CAP. This is despite the fact (or because of the fact?) 
that only one third of defined needs were met in the five most poorly-funded emergency appeals, 
compared with more than three-quarters of need funded in the five best-funded emergencies in 
2006.123 In other words, while relatively more assistance is flowing to, for example, the African 
continent (Figure K), it is not necessarily going to countries needing help to pull out of, or 
protect against, humanitarian crisis, nor are the resources of a kind to make a dent in food 
insecurity—much more to Nigeria for debt relief than to Niger for drought-proofing agriculture.  
Sectoral Allocation of Resources. Even the ODA that does reach to the more vulnerable 
countries may not be of the “right kind.” Many sectors play a role in securing food security, of 
course, but it is significant that while total ODA has been increasing over the past decade, ODA 
allocations to the agriculture sector fell from more than 12 percent of total in 1985–86 to only 3 
percent in 2005–06; over the same period ODA allocated to promotion of economic 
infrastructure also fell from 17 percent to 11 percent.124 Similarly, global ODA allocated to food 
aid (all forms) has fallen from around 11 percent in the mid-1990s to less than 3 percent in 2006. 
The big “gainers” in this shift in resource allocations has been debt relief, “social and 
administrative infrastructure,” and other investment areas that have arguably not been directly 
supportive of food security in poorest countries.  
The same is even true for sector allocations within global humanitarian aid. Much is still made of 
the “bias” towards food aid in responses to CAP appeals, and even food aid agencies would 
agree that that more balance is needed in donor funding so that food can be appropriately and 
adequately complemented by critical non-food resources. So far that is not happening. In CAP 
and Flash Appeals the “food” sector continues to be not only large in absolute terms, but tends to 
be better funded in terms of met needs. For example, during 2007, donor response to CAPS by 
sector saw “agriculture” obtain around 42 percent of its requirements compared with 85 percent 
for food, but also 96 percent for mine action.125 But things are changing—mainly due to the 
price pressure on commodities and fuel. In 2007, food aid represented 34 percent of global 
humanitarian contributions, down from almost 50 percent in 2000 (OCHA financial tracking 
service, as of February 8, 2008). Indeed since 2003, the food sector has accounted for less than 
40 percent of humanitarian contributions tracked by OHCA every year. For the 2008 CAP food 
as a sector represents 36 percent of the total appeal. In other words, there is likely to be far less 
                                                 
123 This led to wide discrepancies in resources available per capita, ranging from less than $20 per capita in Niger to 
more than $300 per capita in Sudan and the tsunami response. DI. 2006. Op. cit.  
124 OECD/DAC. 2008. Table 18.  
125 Taking the response to all Flash Appeals in 2007, agriculture had 89 percent of fund requests met (OCHA 2008. 
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food aid available in 2008, and this continues a downward trend on this sector that started several 
years ago.126  
What is taking the place of food aid? While the volume of CAP funding to agriculture increased 
from $100 million in 2001 to $225 million in 2006, agriculture sector has only grown to 
represent 3 percent of donor CAP commitments as of 2007, the same as “economic recovery and 
infrastructure.” 127 The sectors gaining market share in CAP funding are “not yet specified” and 
“multi-sector” activities, which together account for 50 percent of the global humanitarian appeal 
of 2008. The extent to which projects under these sectors are supportive of the transition from 
humanitarian relief to developmental actions remains unclear—but without a clearer sector—or 
program-transition strategy there is a risk that relief agents will not have the partners or resources 
to effectively promote food security during and after crises.  
Passing the Baton  
The DAC’s formal definition of “humanitarian assistance” (as it currently stands) relates to 
action in assistance, reconstruction or rehabilitation, “during and in the aftermath of an 
emergency.” (GHA 2007, 9) But, how long is the length of an “aftermath”? This is not a 
semantic issue since we are concerned with chronic emergencies when humanitarian need can be 
largely invisible for long periods of time, when one emergency merges into the next with only 
minimal changes in conditions, or when acute humanitarian problems persist long after the 
formal end of emergency operations but just below defined thresholds that would allow for a 
new appeal.  
In 2006, OCHA argued that Somalia’s CAP needed to be refocused towards a) ensuring 
complementarity among humanitarian activities, but also b) seeking to promote “continuity with 
development activities.” 128 This is often easier said than done. WFP’s draft Strategic Plan for 
2008–2011 talks of promoting “relief plus”—interventions that go beyond saving and securing 
lives towards a sustainable recovery, because “making the first steps towards recovery and 
development is too urgent a task to wait for peace.” Yet WFP also identifies a serious constraint 
in that in such circumstances “traditional development partners are not always present.” This 
makes “handing the baton” of responsibility, and therefore, accountability difficult and 
confusing. Cuny argued some years ago that the availability of resources affects the period of 
involvement in any location once a crisis has passed: “agencies with limited resources normally 
work only in the immediate post-disaster period. Agencies with access to more funds will 
become involved in reconstruction.”129 A challenge for many agencies is whether to specialize 
(in relief “or” development), expand mandates (to cover all forms of activity and timing, and 
hence broaden the skills base of personnel), or invest in more seamless partnerships based on 
locally-defined comparative advantage (but potentially giving up agency visibility and credit, 
and therefore resources).  
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Food Policy Report. Washington, DC: IFPRI. 
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129 F. Cuny. 1994. Disasters and Development. Dallas, Texas: Intertect/OXFAM America. 
38 
Where there is no strength in agency coverage, skills or resources supporting aftermath activities 
there are three major challenges: the first is that relief agencies disappear, which often leads to 
countries dropping off the CAP radar. While a country like Burundi has transitioned out of the 
CAP in 2008, arguably due to efforts of the Peacebuilding Commission and relatively high donor 
responses to previous CAPs, that country currently carries the same “risk of future instability” as 
Lebanon and Chad.130 Thus, although OCHA has argued that any continued humanitarian need 
in such cases, “can be handled as part of reconstruction and development planning”131, it is still 
widely believed not only that humanitarian needs do not always disappear at the end of a crisis, 
but that, “the management, administrative and accounting lines drawn between “humanitarian 
need” and “developmental need” tend to be pretty rigid.”132 There are few agencies or programs 
tailored to problems (and places) where the persistent nature of crises has more in common with 
chronic destitution than sudden-onset disasters. Tackling vulnerability in remote parts of Niger, 
Guatemala or Nepal requires attention to common, complex measures to simultaneously address 
factors precipitating crises and those that trap households in deep poverty. The lack of actors 
skilled in such domains means that many projects proposed in CAPs are in fact standard fare—
development projects proposed for places where economic rates of return would rule them out of 
consideration for conventional development grants or loans; or relief interventions dressed up as 
“building community capacity to resist future shocks” through a few training exercises on human 
rights. The effectiveness of either model remains to be appropriately assessed. 
The second major challenge to the process of transition (linked to the first) is the lack of 
analytical coherence in choice among viable options. We have already moved in the “cash versus 
food” debate to a point where the value and limitations of food assistance are increasingly 
understood, and complementarity of actions in both domains is sought.133 Where only limited 
progress has been made is in defining “need” in actionable terms beyond the now (albeit only 
recently) standardized norms for humanitarian action (relating to mortality, morbidity and 
malnutrition). Things done in the name of livelihoods and food security “in the context of 
emergencies” have encompassed training girls to sew, training boat-builders in newer 
construction techniques, providing micro-loans, delivering vaccines for livestock and handing 
out cash. But as Adams and Harvey point out, the diversity of people’s livelihoods makes it 
difficult to decide who should be targeted with what, and how much they should be given, for 
how long.134 Old questions that were posed about food aid now have to be asked about all other 
resource options: How is the need best defined? Is the resource on offer the optimal resource to 
meet defined need? What displacement effects will this intervention have on other livelihood 
coping options? What is the measurable impact of the final choice of resource and intervention?  
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The third challenge is that “rural livelihoods” are themselves changing rapidly, meaning that new 
opportunities as well as risks are emerging and conventional interventions need to be carefully 
set in a more strategic vision of directions in food security. In recent years the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and other major donor institutions have increasingly recommended that 
governments in many vulnerable countries (including Niger, the DRC and Angola) should 
promote rural income diversification out of agriculture, and focus agricultural investment on 
enhanced productivity through irrigation and/or emphasis on crops for export.135 In India the 
IMF recently stated that “there is a need, particularly in the poorly performing states, to diversify 
the economic production base away from agriculture [emphasis added].” 136  
A Focus on Agriculture? Government and Inter-governmental Action 
A result of stagnant or declining support to agriculture in target countries is reduced revenue 
from that sector, which fuels the view that resources should be focused elsewhere, which exposes 
those who depend on rural livelihoods to further erosion of income. Some countries have sought 
to reverse the decline and put more resources into agriculture; in Kenya’s case allocating 3.5 
percent of government investment in 2008–09 versus only 3 percent in 2004–05, while Rwanda 
plans to move from 4 percent to 7 percent.137 But most such increases go to irrigation and export 
crop promotion rather than smallholder agriculture or rural processing and other service 
livelihood promotion.  
However, limited attention to smallholder agriculture is resulting in declining farm size across 
Africa at a time when more people are reliant on those farms. Cultivated area per person has 
fallen from 0.45 hectares (ha) in Ethiopia during the 1970s to 0.25 ha in the 1990s; in 
Mozambique from 0.37 ha to 0.25 ha over the same period, and from 1.07 ha to 0.78 ha in 
Zambia.138 As a result, Jayne suggests, “farm sizes are too small for grain-based productivity 
growth to lift most rural households out of poverty. Hence, diversification into higher-return 
activities will be crucial.” 139 The caveat, of course, is that where smallholders cannot secure 
their minimum consumption and other needs from off the farm, they tend to resort to low-
productivity subsistence agriculture or migrate. The challenge is meeting food needs of the farm 
based poor in the short-term while finding opportunities for rural income growth and 
diversification that make economic sense in risky, often remote, rural environments. What is best 
practice in this regard, and what empirical evidence supports one choice over another? Can 
activities be better prepared through contingency planning, and can analysis of likely options be 
carried out more swiftly in the needs assessment process?  
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It can probably be safely suggested that while the linkages from the humanitarian sector to 
longer-term interventions are not as well developed as they might be (see Section 3), linkages the 
other way around are even less well developed. Several inter-governmental programs in Africa 
focus almost exclusively on agriculture. The US “Presidential Initiative to End Hunger in Africa” 
(IEHA) works in conjunction with the Africa Union’s Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP). Both seek to reduce food insecurity through improving 
production, marketing, rural infrastructure and technology development. However, both tend to 
be focused on areas of relatively higher potential, and while both are addressed as the underlying 
causes of food insecurity, neither attempts any explicit linkages with humanitarian response. 
IEHA is directed mainly at non-crisis countries.140
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is increasingly supporting the development of 
agricultural technology to address problems of hunger and food insecurity. Among other 
initiatives, the Gates Foundation is supporting “Harvest Plus,” which is focusing exclusively on 
breeding and bio-technology. Along with the Ford Foundation and other donors, the Gates 
Foundation is supporting the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) is mainly 
directed at smallholder farmers—a critical link but not necessarily the most vulnerable 
population. Like inter-governmental initiatives, AGRA has no direct links with humanitarian 
action on food insecurity.141
The World Bank is taking a somewhat broader approach, still emphasizing agriculture as the key 
to addressing food insecurity, but embracing trade reform and livelihood diversification as part 
of the strategy, and dealing with other thorny issues such as bio-fuel production. This is laid out 
in the most recent World Development Report.142 Nevertheless, even this approach does not 
emphasize linkages with direct action to address food insecurity in crisis situations.  
While the intent of foundations to improve technology is clear, the capacity of states to manage 
processes is less clear, and highly uneven. Coordinating mechanisms are in place in some 
countries, and clear governmental leadership is present in some countries. Elsewhere, donors and 
agencies call the shots. But it is very difficult to rate or compare state capacity. UNICEF is in the 
process of assessing disaster preparedness capacity across states, but such efforts are rare. 
As Choularton recently argued, it is not useful to complain that most resources go to food aid 
when food aid actors are “more active in determining contingency plans, operational plans and 
appeals responses than non-food actors,” with the result that the latter stay relatively under-
funded.143 Instead, a widely agreed strategy is needed for defining what can and should be 
appropriately done in the name of food security under various contexts, with clearer roles for 
multiple actors identified in the short and long run. This is needed given the recent proliferation 
in the number of new actors defining roles for themselves in the large tent that is “food security.”  
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2.5. Food Security Architecture 
According to one recent review of global humanitarian action, “current trends and patterns 
suggest the emergence of a new humanitarian architecture.” 144 There are potentials and 
challenges in the arrival of new players and new kinds of resources. The Asian tsunami 
generated involvement of a larger than usual range of donors and implementers, some of whom 
have appeared to be willing to continue their engagement in humanitarian activity. Of the ninety-
nine government donors responding to the tsunami, thirteen were “first-time” donors, and by 
2008, the CAP process was engaging 188 separate agencies in the process.145  
Part of the rising volume of ODA flowing to humanitarian action is explained by the rise in 
traditional donors like Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland, and New Zealand that have become 
important HA donors when a decade before they were not. But another part relates to non-
traditional donors. It has been estimated that of the almost doubling of total humanitarian aid 
between 2001 and 2005, the largest share of the increase came from private sector flows.146 
Development Initiatives estimate that the share of private sector flows within global 
humanitarian assistance has grown from 14 percent in 2001 to 35 percent in 2005. Such a large 
share is unlikely to continue, but many analysts consider that levels will remain higher than 
before the tsunami.147 Several multilateral agencies, like WFP and UNICEF, have been 
developing longer-term relations with private companies and corporations based on staff sharing, 
asset loaning in crisis, standby agreements and funding. Some companies have taken it upon 
themselves to respond to crises by rapidly shifting product lines, offering products as in-kind 
resources, or working through staff to reach out to local communities in which their industries 
are based.  
On the other hand, some agencies not formerly engaged in humanitarian work in a major way 
have moved into the arena, and new forms of partnership and harmonization are being tried out 
with a view to securing more effective combined action. For example, contributions to FAO’s 
emergency programming increased from $44 million in 1994–95 to roughly $370 million in 
2005–06.148 Such a large increase reflects recognition of FAO’s important roles in crisis 
prevention (through early warning and rapid containment of threats such as locusts and avian 
flu), as well as in recovery of agricultural economies and rural livelihoods.149 But there are now 
many more UN and other intergovernmental players seeking to work in the domain of 
livelihoods and food security. For instance UNDP, as IASC Cluster lead agency on “early 
recovery,” engages more extensively than before in community-level disaster-related activities, 
including supporting early warning systems; carrying out disaster impact assessments (as in 
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Aceh when UNDP jointly with the World Bank took the lead on the damage and recovery needs 
assessment), and designing rehabilitation programs—activities which some donors and analysts 
have argued should be left to technical agencies rather than taken on by a coordinating 
institution.150  
Similarly, the World Bank has increased its focus on supporting low- and middle-income 
countries affected by either conflict or continuing fragility of state structures, recognizing that 
such country settings require a strategic approach that is “not business as usual”. According to its 
recent thinking, “fragile states are not always conflict-affected, and conflict-affected countries 
are not necessarily hampered by fragile institutions—but there are important commonalities, as 
many fragile states are affected by conflict and many conflict-affected countries are plagued by 
weak institutions and low capacity.” 151 Part of the response has been raising support for work of 
the post-Conflict Fund (PCF), which supports planning, piloting and analysis of activities 
through partner organizations, with an emphasis is on speed and flexibility. Rapidly disbursed 
grants are focused on the restoration of the lives and livelihood of war-affected population, with 
a premium placed on partnerships with other donors and executing agencies and leveraging 
resources through a variety of funding arrangements. Since 1997, the PCF has disbursed a total 
amount of $75 million through this channel.  
However, UN and Bretton Woods institutions are not the only players these days. According to 
some analysts, “the international system for development cooperation and humanitarian 
assistance is a fragmented one. The lack of coordination between humanitarian response and 
long-term development assistance is weak, with early recovery and transition only slowly 
gaining momentum.” 152 According to Vaux, “the system as a whole is not functioning 
effectively in terms of its basic purpose.” 153 Indeed, a lack of effective leadership and 
collaboration among so-called food agencies and their collaborating financial institutions has 
been posited as leaving a power vacuum that “will be filled by multinational agribusiness and the 
new philanthro-capitalists.” 154  
To some extent this is already happening. New “non-governmental” bodies are taking up much 
of this space, such as the Gates Foundation (which is setting new agendas backed up by very 
large resources), renewed attention to agriculture by older foundations like Rockefeller and Ford; 
new commitments to food security are taking shape in the context of regional organizations, such 
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as ASEAN and Africa’s NEPAD, the Millennium Villages initiative activities, etc. mentioned 
earlier. Most such activities/initiatives/institutions are directly engaged with the humanitarian 
endeavor, but most are at least indirectly and all represent new potential partners with whom the 
relief community will have to work if enhanced effectiveness is to be achieved. Building these 
linkages will be a challenge. 
Coordination, Effectiveness, and Accountability  
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, endorsed in 2005 by over 100 countries and donor 
organizations recognized “the imperative of managing aid more rationally.”155 The five 
principles of the Declaration include: (1) enhanced ownership (actions driven by national 
development priorities), (2) better alignment of donor funding to national strategies, (3) 
harmonization of activities in ways that “minimize the cost of delivering aid,” (4) managing for 
results, and (5) mutual accountability. The focus of that declaration was the development arena, 
but such principles apply to humanitarian action, albeit in slightly adapted form, given that there 
often is no functioning national government with which to forge “ownership” and aid is usually 
delivered not through national accounts but close to the ground via non-governmental entities. 
As a result, the principles of humanitarian reform—also launched in 2005—provide a 
complementary focus on, (1) partnership (which goes beyond government-to-government 
interaction, (2) accountability (to those affected, not merely to donors of resources), and (3) 
predictability (which seeks to enhance attention to roles and responsibility).  
The remaining goals of the Paris Declaration and of Humanitarian Reform relate to managing for 
results, and accountability for those results. Of course, the Paris Declaration was not promoting 
managing for results in a vacuum. Their recommendations focus on reducing the transaction 
costs of delivering and managing aid of all kinds, and on developing “credible monitoring 
mechanisms” (OECD 2007, 13), both with a view to enhanced accountability—not only by and 
for donors, but also for and by national governments and beneficiary communities. Frederick 
Cuny called for this in the 1990s, arguing that “unless mechanisms are developed to hold 
interveners accountable to the victims, post-disaster programs will continue to have only limited 
and mostly negative impact.” 156
It is not surprising, then, that many recent critiques of humanitarian action argue for more 
attention to be paid to documenting impact.157 The OECD argues that managing for results 
requires countries and donors alike to, “use performance assessment frameworks and most cost-
effective results-oriented report.”158 OCHA calls for “new levels of accountability and 
responsibility throughout the system.”159 Steps have already been taken to better define the 
measures, and techniques for measuring, impact in the context of humanitarian action (the seven 
criteria originally developed for evaluation of complex emergencies being: (1) relevance/ 
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appropriateness of the response, (2) connectedness, (3) coherence, (4) coverage, (5) efficiency, 
(6) effectiveness, and (7) impact.160  
Yet, the international community still does not have a widely agreed, easily communicated, 
empirically measurable metric for “humanitarian need” that would allow for rapid assessment of 
the appropriate response, allow for prioritization among competing crises/resources, guide 
evidence-based programming, and facilitate objective measures of impact. It has been argued 
that, “without a consistent common denominator of need which can be applied across all 
emergency situations, it is very difficult to say whether needs are being met, or whether 
humanitarian assistance is either equitable or adequate…the fact is that measuring the response 
to CAP appeals remains the only way of assessing whether needs have been met on a comparable 
basis between emergencies.”161  
This is a problem when dealing “just” with the life-saving aspects of humanitarian response. It 
becomes more complex when dealing with the food security and livelihoods aspects of “need” 
and measurable impact. Progress has certainly been made recently with WFP’s SENAC project, 
the continued evolution of the Integrated Phase Classification (first applied to Somalia but now 
being elaborated in several other countries), the GDAC early warning work, the conflict 
barometer of Uppsala University, the Risk Assessment ranking work at the University of 
Maryland, and so on. Additionally, some donors like ECHO’s Global Needs Assessment 
methodology (GNA) and Canadian CIDA’s approach to calibrating its global response (which 
has several features in common with the IPC in that it considers a broad range of variables).162 
Nevertheless, as Venton puts it, evidence of costs and benefits “is limited and very location- and 
hazard-specific.”163  
Several domains of “architecture” require urgent attention. The first is the issue just discussed—
measurable results and accountability. Evidence-based programming, and monitoring as well as 
evaluation of impact are both a sine qua non of humanitarian relief.164 Documenting 
effectiveness of actions taken, including impacts (outcomes among beneficiaries rather than 
inputs provided) is a priority. This clearly implies dedication of more resources to implement 
effective evaluations in emergency contexts, as well as continued methodological development 
on definitions of need, and training and capacity building for effective evaluation. It also 
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involves a commitment to greater learning—and as noted above, the track record on institutional 
learning is not very good.165  
The second is the poorly coordinated response between humanitarian action undertaken to 
protect food security in the short term (whether in the classic form of actual provisioning, or 
other means of protecting assets, production, or marketing), and longer-term efforts to address 
underlying causes of food insecurity. Tensions arise between different agencies—or even within 
the same agency if it has multiple mandates, over linkages and responsibilities. But more 
classically, different agencies tend to act in isolation from each other, according to their 
mandates and capacities. Where national governments have the capacity to coordinate these 
efforts, decision making structures at national, levels can bring different stakeholders together to 
reach consensus on these issues.166 These require reasonable political stability and the capacity 
of the host state to actually manage these processes. But even among external agencies, there is 
tension over who should intervene under what kinds of circumstances, with what interventions, 
for how long, and with what kind of exit/transition strategy? National government-led forums are 
probably the best way to sort these questions out, but many governments do not have the 
capacity. The cluster system (see next section) is intended to help in emergencies, but not 
necessarily in the longer term. 
The third challenge is the uncertainty about where and how decisions get made, what policies 
and approaches are needed, and who is responsible for doing what? Many “lessons learned” over 
the course of the years have been formulated but not necessarily acted on, and outside the 
boundaries of individual organizations, there is not clear mandate of anyone to ensure 
institutional learning. As already noted, recent critiques of the humanitarian sector fault agencies 
for being “learning challenged,” but don’t give practical advice on what to do about it.167 This is 
a challenge both to individual agencies and to the collective effort of agencies—in other words 
both a learning and a coordination challenge.
2.6. Change and Reform Processes 
Given the nature and the severity of many of the problems outlined, a number of change or 
reform processes have been put in place in recent years—some of these are specifically related to 
food security, but most of these processes are general, and do not prioritize one sector or 
humanitarian outcome over another—and at least one that seems to de-prioritize food security as 
a cross cutting theme. These processes include UN reform, donor reforms, and agency reforms. 
This section briefly reviews these to address the question of whether such reform processes are 
leading to greater effectiveness of the system. 
UN Reform Processes 
UN reform processes stand on three legs: improved internal coherence, improved external 
coordination, and more rationalized and centralized funding. The Humanitarian Response 
Review in 2005 noted some progress towards improved accountability, but with some 
                                                 
165 Weiss and Hoffman, 2007. Op. cit. 
166 The “New Coalition for Food Security” in Ethiopia, or the Kenya Food Security Steering Group, are examples of 
multi-party coordination groups. These are far from perfect, but have begun to address these issues.  
167 Weiss and Hoffman 2007. Op. cit. 
46 
contradictory imperatives; some improvement on the quality and timeliness of response, but still 
sometimes a “silo” approach implying ineffective integration, and inadequate measurement of 
results.168 Coordination was noted as improving, but lacking a global vision and remaining very 
personality dependent. In general, the report found poor preparedness and HR capacity, and 
limited surge capacity. While there was increased awareness of protection issues, there remained 
poor levels of capacity in protection. And the issue of internally displaced people remained 
unresolved. 
Unified Missions: “Delivering as One.” The first leg of UN reform is about improving internal 
coherence. The report of the UN High-Level Panel, “Delivering as One,” made the case for 
merging UN operations in human rights, economic development, security and environmental 
elements into a more unified approach, at the headquarter level, but especially at the country 
level, with one leader, one office and one budget.169 Couched in the language of the Millennium 
Development Goals, the report calls for greater consolidation of activities, the elimination of 
duplication, multi-year centralized funding, greater attention to gender equity and environmental 
concerns, and more focus on results. Regarding humanitarian action, the report calls for better 
coordination through the cluster system, more investment in risk reduction and early warning, 
and greater emphasis on protection. The report frames the UN mission more in economic 
development terms than in either political or humanitarian terms, with a “sustainable 
development board” to oversee UN operations, and a UN Development Coordinator to lead in-
country operations on a multi-year funding mechanism with a common evaluation system. The 
countries in which the approach was to be piloted, for the most part were facing neither major 
humanitarian emergencies nor intractable food insecurity—although several of them face some 
challenges in these areas.170 Humanitarian assistance was to follow the cluster approach, with 
some of the initial response needs to be funded by the Central Emergency Response Fund. In 
theory, at least under some circumstances, this kind of approach should enable stronger 
programmatic linkages between humanitarian response and longer-term efforts to address food 
insecurity. At the same time, however, it was widely feared to have paid inadequate attention to 
the problem of subsuming humanitarian action under a unified agenda, hence subordinating the 
humanitarian mission of the UN to political or economic objectives, and thus perhaps 
marginalizing the humanitarian imperative—particularly in complex emergency situations where 
the UN/host country government partnership would be strained anyway. So far a pilot has been 
implemented in eight countries, most of which are not in the midst of a humanitarian emergency, 
so it is too soon to judge, but Maurer notes for example, that “…it is not clear how safeguards 
such as the principle of non-refoulement can continue to be guaranteed given that the process is 
government…driven.” 171
The Cluster System. The second leg of UN reform has been the “cluster approach” to improving 
system-wide effectiveness, coordination and accountability. The idea behind the cluster approach 
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is to bring some coherence to cross-cutting programmatic areas in which there are a number of 
actors. These original areas included logistics; emergency telecommunications; emergency 
shelter; health; nutrition; water, sanitation, and hygiene; early recovery; camp coordination and 
camp management; and protection. Agriculture and education were subsequently added. There is 
no cluster for either food security or livelihoods more broadly. 
Although initiated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Emergency Response in 2005, to 
date the cluster approach has only been piloted in a limited number of countries and 
emergencies, but these include a mix of chronic and short-term emergencies, and a mix of 
conflict situations and climatic, tectonic or environmentally triggered emergencies. There is to 
date one substantive evaluation of the cluster approach.172 It notes that the approach has 
improved efforts to identify and address gaps in the response system and has helped to foster 
stronger leadership, but it is too soon to make any assessment of improved accountability. 
Engagement of host country governments has been mixed, and the performance of individual 
clusters has been variable. Other, less formal early assessments of the cluster approach indicate 
some improvements in information systems and standards, but note that it is too soon to assess 
impact which in any case is still dependent on the leadership of the humanitarian coordinator.173
Humanitarian Benchmarking. A related effort in improving response and accountability is the 
humanitarian benchmarking initiative, intended to develop an industry-wide consensus on 
mortality and malnutrition indicators to inform both the prioritization of response and the 
tracking of the impact of response. This initiative is independent of the cluster system led by a 
diverse group of agencies and the IASC. 
UN Humanitarian Funding Mechanisms. The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was 
founded in 1991 to expedite emergency response by making at least a limited amount of funding 
available quickly (i.e., outside an appeals process). The CERF was increased to $500M in 2005, 
but this is still only a tiny portion of total humanitarian funding. The CERF has become a well-
received rapid-disbursement option for response to unforeseen disasters (a complement to the 
CAP process). In 2007 alone it channeled $232 million to CAP and Flash appeals. The CERF is 
seen as bolstering the functions UN country teams, which is one of the main goals of UN reform 
more broadly. NGOs complain that funding for them through the CERF is still quite limited. So, 
while serving a useful and somewhat expanded role, the CERF is still a limited tool, both in 
scope and in terms of who can actually access funding through it. 
The Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) was designed to support a more coherent strategic 
humanitarian response effort, and was piloted in two chronic-emergency countries in 2006—
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. By strengthening the resource allocation function 
of UN Humanitarian Coordinators, it improved the planning, prioritization and coordination of 
response, and provided better incentive to humanitarian actors for coordination. The CHF was 
better able to link with cluster initiatives, depending on the lead in-country. Like the CERF, 
NGOs reported that that the CHF is too UN-focused. While better coordination resulted, the 
timeliness of disbursement did not improve and the goal of predictable funding was not 
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significantly enhanced. So while the CHF represents a “significant step forward,” there are many 
improvements still to be made.174  
The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) remains as the major UN funding mechanism, 
including for some (but not all) of the countries implementing the cluster system. Fewer 
countries are, however, covered by the CAP process. All three of these UN-based funding 
mechanisms account for less that 10 percent of official humanitarian funding—it is hard to say 
proportion of total funding related to food security. The question of funding must be addressed 
more broadly than just in UN reforms. 
Donor Reform Processes 
Official funding for humanitarian assistance across the boards nearly doubled from about $10B 
in 2000 to over $18 billion in 2005 (not including the unprecedented additional $5.5 billion in 
2005 for the tsunami response alone).175 However, some of the processes of reform have slowed 
this rate of growth. There is substantial growth in funding outside official (OECD-DAC) 
channels (private contributions to NGOs, funds channeled through military forces rather than aid 
agencies, non-DAC donors, and diaspora remittances all add to the total).  
While the system clearly does not function on the basis of needs, there is still no good way to 
measure the impartiality of the system. That needs to be considered at both the global level and 
at country level. The tracking of overall funding remains insufficient—non-DAC contributions 
are not systematically tracked. The level of funding is still quite volatile, and not based on good 
predictions. It is not timely enough or flexible enough to permit response to rapidly changing 
conditions on the ground176
The Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative. The Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative 
(GHD) was begun in 2003 with the objectives of improving donors ability to save lives and 
alleviate suffering; to provide assistance according to need: to provide adequate, predictable, 
flexible funding; and to improve donor accountability and learning. A recent evaluation of the 
GHD initiative notes that for the potential of GHD to be realized, donors need to improve their 
commitment to these ideals. Specifically, better tracking is required of the responsibilities and 
accountability of donors; a “collective performance framework” is needed that covers the 
principles that have been agreed and the improvements that are being sought. At the same time, 
agencies need to engage more with the GHD initiative to enhance implementation and hold 
donor accountable to the goals embraced.177 Two areas of improvement were noted required in a 
recent evaluation: needs-based allocation of resources and strengthening the evidence base for 
determining needs-based decision making. A recent review of the EU’s performance under the 
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GHD notes on-going challenges in the area of coordination with other donors, funding according 
to need, and limited policy transparency (oddly, it made no reference to timeliness—a frequent 
criticism of EU humanitarian funding).178
Changes in US Funding. The US is the largest single donor. It has introduced a number of 
changes in funding over recent years that have an impact on humanitarian funding generally and 
on food security specifically. First, in a trend exemplified by—but by no means restricted to—
the US, assistance is increasingly flowing through a security apparatus, not a development or 
humanitarian apparatus. According to an OECD report, between 2000 and 2005 the proportion of 
US official development assistance (including humanitarian aid) channeled through USAID 
dropped from 50 percent to 39 percent and the proportion channeled through the Department of 
Defense increased from 6 percent to 22 percent.179 And much of US foreign assistance funding is 
now explicitly tied to security or counter-terrorism objectives, with poverty-reduction or 
humanitarian objectives becoming a lower priority in resource allocation.180
Figure 8: Trend in Total Food Aid Volume, 1990–2006 
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Source: Reproduced from DI 2008 based on WFP/INTERFAIS data. 
Food Aid Reform. Food aid has long been not only the predominant response to food insecurity 
(whether of a transitory or chronic nature), but also the biggest single category of humanitarian 
response. Between 2000 and 2005, food aid was not only the biggest single category of response 
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in CAP appeals, on average it was bigger than all other sectors combined.181 However, as Figure 
8 depicts, levels of food aid have been steadily declining. With rapidly increasing costs of food 
and transportation and food aid budgets relatively flat, this decline is likely to continue. Some of 
the debates over food aid policy are about determining the circumstances under which food aid is 
the most appropriate response to food insecurity, but others are more specifically about the 
reform or lack of it in the broader funding of humanitarian and food security response. These 
have to do with the “untying” of food aid from donor country source markets, and preventing 
food aid from undermining trade. The emerging consensus—though none exists formally—is 
that food aid remains an appropriate resource where markets cannot respond to increased 
demand, and cash transfers would cause food price inflation; that “untied” aid (or at least the 
ability to purchase food locally or regionally) is both more cost-efficient and timely than trans-
oceanic shipment; and that well-targeted, humanitarian food aid doesn’t significantly undermine 
other forms of food trade.182 But this emerging consensus hasn’t yet convinced US-based 
agencies and policy-makers, who have traditionally used food aid not only for response to 
humanitarian food crises, but also to fund development programs with food security objectives, 
and who have cultivated deep relations with domestic business constituencies who profit from 
traditional modes of food aid. The fear is that if these domestic business constituencies don’t get 
some share of the benefits of the program, they will no longer lobby for it, and the resources that 
had been made available in the form of US food aid will simply disappear. The food aid 
components of the “Farm Bill” legislation currently making its way through the US Congress 
actually represents a significant step away from the consensus outlined above, but its strongly 
supported by US agribusiness, shipping and NGO lobbies. Other factors are at play among non-
US donors, including stronger commitments to relatively un-tied cash donations for food aid, 
counter-balanced by tighter cash-based budgets for development assistance among several 
traditional donors. Continuing debate over the future direction of the Food Aid Convention and 
potential disciplines on some kinds of food aid in WTO negotiations mean that many issues of 
global concern have yet to be resolved 
Agency Reform Processes 
Since the debacle of the response to the Rwanda genocide and the subsequent refugee crisis in 
the Congo, the humanitarian community has initiated a variety of reforms, including the Sphere 
Project, the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP-I), the Action Learning Network for 
Accountability and Performance (ALNAP), the implementation of “do no harm” approaches, and 
various efforts at inter-agency coordination. These have all been reviewed in sufficient detail 
elsewhere.183  
However, some analyses of the aid sector note lingering problems. The level of competition for 
funding that has caused private, voluntary actors to behave more like for-profit businesses; and 
led donors to behave in a more oligopolistic manner. In chronic crisis or chronic poverty 
situations this funding environment has led to shorter, not longer, planning time-frames; and a 
more reactive mode of operation. Coordination is a good word, but gets more lip service than 
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real action: the inability to act collectively is a real constraint to effectiveness. And despite 
efforts on the part of agencies regarding “lessons learned,” or after-action reviews, there is a 
repeated failure system-wide to learn from experience.184 The multiplication of actors (military, 
non-state, and private for-profit) in both the humanitarian sector and in food security in many 
ways amplifies the difficulties the difficulties that agencies face. And as noted above, there is 
still a very blurred boundary between “emergency response” and “development programming.” 
Some analysis suggest that this has become such a pervasive problem that an entirely new kind 
of organization might be required to deal with it. 
2.7. Effectiveness of the “System:” Some Issues Arising 
According to the former director of USAID, “all implementation mechanisms have weaknesses 
and strengths. There is no “pure” or optimum method. There are inherent trade-offs.… The 
debate over aid effectiveness is [not] properly capturing these inherent tensions and 
contradictions. The problem…today is to manage complexity.” 185 The humanitarian system is 
inherently as complex as humanitarian emergencies that the system seeks to respond to, mitigate 
and resolve. Nevertheless, that cannot be used as an excuse for not pursuing greater 
effectiveness, which is key to greater accountability. Several challenges can be highlighted, and 
are briefly discussed.  
 How to improve analysis, including needs assessments and impact evaluation, making them 
more evidence-based, more transparent, more rigorous, and more closely tied to decision-
making on priorities? 
 How to increase the level, predictability, and effective impartial disbursement of appropriate 
resources for responding to objectively defined needs? 
 How to further enhance effectiveness, coordination and sectoral efficiency? 
 How to improve institutional learning at both the individual agency level and the collective 
“humanitarian community” level? 
 How to integrate the perennially short-term perspective of the humanitarian industry with the 
long-term problems of chronic food insecurity? 
Improving Analysis 
It is clear that several trends must be incorporated more thoroughly into the analysis of food 
insecurity—the causes, levels of need, appropriate responses, and impact of interventions. In 
terms of understanding trends, urbanization has long been factored into analysis, but the relative 
levels of urbanization and the different livelihood risks and opportunities faced by very poor 
urban residents make it a topic for renewed concern. Food security crises have, for the most part, 
been considered rural phenomena, but the prospect for urban and peri-urban crises in the future 
must be considered. Climate change is on everyone’s agenda, but its impact on food security 
goes far beyond just the impact on agricultural production. Increased world-wide demand for 
grain and other basic food stuffs has changed food prices significantly—whether this signals a 
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sea-change in the medium to long term remains to be seen, but it is certainly likely to cause 
dramatic changes in the short term. 
Analysis of food security has improved substantially in recent years, improving the transparency 
and comparability of analysis, and generally contributing to evidence-based programming. But 
much remains to be done. Though it has been thirteen years since the publication of Early 
Warning and Early Response: the Missing Links,186 much of the analysis of that book remains 
relevant today, implying that the improvements made in analysis have yet to be translated into 
improved food security for poor or crisis-affected populations.  
While the definition of failure is clear, the definition of “success” in humanitarian food security 
programming remains elusive, and linked to issues far beyond the reach of humanitarian actors—
a topic picked up in the following section. 
Improving the Allocation of Resources 
Much emphasis has bee put on improving analysis to enable the impartial allocation of response, 
but while analysis has arguably improved, there is scant evidence that the either the impartiality 
of response has improved, or that programming is more evidence-based. This is in part because 
geo-political concerns of donors continue to trump either analysis or impartiality as the basis for 
resource allocation. The unified mission approach of the UN probably doesn’t help this matter 
any—subsuming humanitarian concerns under a political and security banner. The question is 
whether or not humanitarian actors are willing to take these questions on—a process that might 
be equated with “biting the hand that feeds you.” 
Centralizing funding may have improved response among UN agencies, but so far it has done 
little to improve the speed and predictability of funding to other agencies or to governments. 
Food security analysis is better attuned to multiple causal factors, but it is far from clear that 
improved analysis enables speedier response. And even if acted on in a timely manner, it isn’t 
clear that the programming tool-box of humanitarian food security actors enables appropriate 
responses, particularly in terms of addressing all the causal factors and in what sequence. The 
bias towards food aid responses has been tempered both in analytical terms and by the current 
high prices of food and transportation, but is still significant. Reforming food aid remains an 
important part of the agenda of improving response. 
Effectiveness and Coordination: Has Reform Improved the “System?”  
A 2005 report on the status of humanitarian reform noted that the efforts in play at the time did 
not add up to a radical agenda for change or even a strategic overhaul of the humanitarian 
system.187 Two years on, this conclusion remains much the same: there are useful, if somewhat 
piece-mail, reforms under way. Some of these address some of the shortcomings analyzed above 
with regard to the nature of the response to the lingering problem of hunger and food insecurity. 
But it is difficult to see any radical change coming out of the current mix of reforms. 
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There is a lot of money in the humanitarian system at the moment, but it is increasing but at a 
slowing pace, and is failing to keep up with need. It is difficult to say conclude very much about 
the sector-specific or agency-specific effectiveness of this money. And according to many 
observers, the cumulative impact of the money itself and the institutional arrangements through 
which it is made available are having unintended and negative impacts of the effectiveness of the 
overall system.188
There is no cluster for food security, but no consensus about whether there should be one. The 
purpose of the approach was to identify and address gaps, so it would appear that there is no 
consensus that food security constituted a programmatic gap—a notion difficult to reconcile with 
the reality on the ground in almost all chronic crises, and many if not most transitory 
emergencies. With increasing attention to cash programming, and livelihoods responses beyond 
food aid, in areas that have little to do with agriculture per se, there would seem to be every 
reason for arguing for greater coherence in food security response. The fact that the cluster 
approach has been only a limited success so far detracts nothing from the argument that greater 
coherence and leadership is required. The evaluation of the cluster approach concludes with a 
call to create a food cluster: Does the humanitarian food security community agree? 
Institutional Learning and Chronic Food Insecurity 
The question of institutional learning, especially at the collective “humanitarian community” 
level, is a difficult one. Countless “lessons learned” exercises have been conducted, and some 
agencies are building better feedback loops to incorporate this into their own information and 
planning base. But there is a distinct collective action problem here—getting into issues of 
ownership as much as learning. External critiques are harsh, but don’t necessarily offer good 
advice on how to improve. This clearly constitutes one area for further reflection. 
The question of how to integrate the perennially short-term perspective of the humanitarian 
industry with the longer-term demands of dealing with chronic food insecurity is dealt with in 
depth in the following section. 
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PART 3: LINKING RESPONSES TO “CHRONIC” 
AND “TRANSITORY” FOOD INSECURITY 
ETHIOPIA: Despite record production, eight million chronically food-insecure people require 
food and cash assistance. Estimates indicate that 2.4 million acutely foodinsecure people will 
also require assistance due to security restrictions in Somali Region, inflation, and localized poor 
rains. 
From FEWSNET Executive Overview of Food Security, January 2008 
3.1. A Framework for Understanding the Linkages 
Among the most stubborn of problems in dealing with food insecurity has been the inability to 
satisfactorily link chronic and transitory food insecurity and responses to these two related, but 
etiologically different, problems. Nowhere is this problem brought into sharper focus than in 
Ethiopia, where, despite record production, and despite billions of dollars worth of assistance 
devoted to alleviating chronic food security over recent years, nearly one person in eight required 
external “emergency” assistance to achieve adequate food consumption this year. This inability 
to forge the appropriate linkages occurs in several areas: the conceptual/analytical linkages, 
programmatic linkages, funding/donor linkages, and policy linkages. This section of the paper 
discusses the major gaps still facing the humanitarian food security community in building 
stronger linkages and notes the progress made in these different areas. 
The terms, “chronic” and “transitory,” like much of the terminology of food security, are subject 
to various definitions, but one useful way of characterizing the differences it to say that chronic 
food insecurity is a persistent inability to access adequate food and nutritional intake, whereas 
transitory food insecurity is of a shorter (expected) duration and often involves a precipitous 
decline in access and consumption against baseline conditions (implying nothing about the 
adequacy of baseline conditions). “Transitory” should not be confused with “acute”—a term 
which implies a degree of severity; “transitory” and “chronic” imply mainly a temporal 
dimension. It is of course possible to have both chronic and transitory food insecurity in varying 
degrees of severity.189
Beyond the “Relief to Development” Continuum 
Conceptually and programmatically, the linkage between “transitory” and “chronic” was 
classically framed in terms of the “relief-to-development continuum.”190 Originating largely with 
respect to the response to drought disasters and other climatically or environmentally triggered 
emergencies in Africa in the 1980s or early 1990s, the continuum presumed that crises have a 
distinct beginning and end, and that the normative direction for programming was to complete 
the action dealing with transitory food insecurity (“relief”) and get on to dealing with chronic 
problems (“development”) as quickly as possible. It soon became clear that, even in climatically 
or environmentally triggered crises, progression towards “development” was not such a linear 
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process, and that progress might be “backwards” (towards crisis rather than progressing away 
from it). And of course, little of this thinking applied directly in complex emergencies. By the 
mid- to late-1990s it was discredited analytically, and was replaced by the notion of a 
“contiguum”—a variation that recognized that programming might be taking place 
simultaneously, or contiguously, at different stages of what had originally been conceived of as a 
linear progression from “relief” to “development. Conceptually, the literature on risk and 
vulnerability has moved beyond “continuum” thinking, but haven’t produced a similar 
programming framework.191
The funding problem—long recognized, but with relatively few institutional changes to date in 
the way donor agencies are organized—is simple: Donor agencies tend to have an “emergency” 
window and a “development” or “non-emergency” window.192 While there have been some 
attempts to capture programmatic activities such as livelihood protection or rehabilitation, these 
have often eventually ended up being subsumed under one or the other of the two major donor 
windows and are traditionally quite under-funded. Reconstruction and rehabilitation don’t turn 
up as an entry in official ODA figures until 2004, even though these activities were being 
discussed in the 1980s and 1990s.193 Nevertheless, it remains a fairly consistent observation over 
time that transitory food insecurity, clearly linked with an identified causal factor or defined 
“shock,” tends to draw greater attention and greater levels of resources than does chronic food 
insecurity that might actually be a more serious problem in terms of scale and severity, but which 
is not clearly defined in time or linked to a specific cause or shock.194  
This raises the specter that transitory food insecurity associated with a precipitous decline in the 
ability to access adequate food will elicit a greater response than chronic food insecurity, even if 
the latter is demonstrably more severe.195 In terms of the numbers of people affected, chronic 
food insecurity far outweighs transitory. 
Because the original linkages were formulated in terms of drought or “natural disasters” in 
Africa, political causes of food crises were often left out of the analysis. However, more recently 
it has become clear that many “chronic crises” are either directly as a result of conflict, or have a 
more explicit political causation to it than the original “continuum” thinking took into account. 
This makes formulating the linkages—and especially addressing the linkages programmatically 
—more difficult for humanitarian actors because addressing them can easily be interpreted as 
fundamentally contrary to humanitarian principles (especially under a classic view of neutrality 
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—which forbade engagement in “political controversy”). Nevertheless, multi-mandate agencies 
have had to deal with this problem, and experience is accumulating that, even in conflict 
situations, humanitarian actors can address underlying causes of food insecurity or other 
humanitarian outcomes without compromising humanitarian principles.196  
The stronger linkage of aid of all types to political and security agendas in the post-September 11 
era, has had several effects. On the one hand, it has probably increased funding for addressing 
chronic problems related to income and livelihoods, but the focus has shifted away from 
humanitarian concerns as ends in themselves and to humanitarian assistance as the means of 
addressing security concerns. 197 And it has significantly shrunk humanitarian space to address 
the needs of disaster affected people on a purely impartial basis—in other words security 
concerns, not humanitarian concerns, are driving this kind of aid. Examples include large, 
USAID-funded projects that simultaneously have livelihoods objectives and “winning hearts and 
minds” objectives in areas where Islamic extremist insurgencies are a security problem—such as 
Afghanistan or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, and parts of the Greater 
Horn of Africa.198 This “instrumentalization” of aid is intentional—not an unfortunate by-
product—of contemporary policy.199
Summarizing the debate about aid in protracted crises, a recent report by the Humanitarian 
Policy Group notes that whereas previously, “continuum” thinking and practice was led by 
humanitarian and multi-mandate agencies, current thinking on assistance in protracted crises is 
led by political and security actors. Whereas conflict was largely absent from discussions about 
the continuum, it dominates the current debate at least insofar as concerns about security and 
“failed states” have been raised (note however, that the primary driver here is not the security of 
the citizens of “failed states”). While the issue of compromised humanitarian principles—
somewhat left out of original “continuum” thinking with its emphasis on natural disasters—is 
more incorporated into the debate, it has been eroded by foreign policy and security imperatives. 
Other elements of contemporary thinking—a human security perspective, rights-based 
approaches, risk reduction, and links to the Millennium Development Goals—have increased the 
scope for linking chronic and transitory problems, but have been somewhat subordinated to the 
security agenda Funding in (at least some) protracted crises has increased and the bifurcation (or 
at least inflexibility) of aid donors has declined in some cases, but this has come at the cost of 
stronger linkage with security concerns, the use of aid to achieve security objectives and the use 
of force to protect aid investments. And while there is greater commitment to work in protracted 
crises, there has been relatively less programmatic innovation in long-term work in conflict 
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situations.200 This has led to different understandings of risk and of programmatic linkages, but 
some problems remain that are discussed in the following sections. 
Understanding Vulnerability and Risk 
The literature on vulnerability and risk has likewise changed. The risk of food insecurity (or 
other negative outcome) is often suggested to be a function of some kind of hazard (an event or 
shock) combined with vulnerability, or the susceptibility of a given community or group to a 
hazard. This is noted in shorthand as: R = f (H,V).  
Vulnerability in this framework is understood to be internal to the livelihood system, whereas 
hazards are thought to be external.201 In the context of climatically or environmentally induced 
food insecurity, whether of a transitory or chronic nature, this focus on risk has opened up a new 
and significant area of programmatic intervention, called disaster risk reduction (specifically 
identifying and reducing the risk of certain kinds of hazards), or disaster risk management (a 
more systematic means of incorporating policies, programs and administrative processes to both 
reduce risks and mitigate impacts). Political concerns and conflict have increasingly arisen with 
regard to the question of “failed” or “fragile” states, but also with greater understanding of what 
makes people vulnerable in complex emergencies. The latter is often quite different from what 
makes people vulnerable in “natural” disasters or situations of chronic poverty. Assets (such as 
money, possessions, or even education) may become liabilities. Identity—ethnic, religious, 
national—takes on greater important in terms of both vulnerability and protection, depending on 
the circumstances (but was largely ignored in analyzing vulnerability in chronic poverty or 
natural disasters). While these concerns have been incorporated into some analyses, they are 
largely still missing from programmatic responses, particularly in terms of risk reduction 
strategies, which tend to be overwhelmingly concerned with climatic, environmental and other 
“non-political” risks. 
There is increasing recognition in the food security literature of the difference between 
“covariate” and “idiosyncratic” shocks. “Covariate” shocks are events that lead to the 
unexpected loss of income, consumption or assets of a large group people in a given place as a 
result of a single cause—the classic example being drought, flooding, conflict or displacement. 
“Idiosyncratic” shocks, on the other hand, lead to the losses that affect single individuals, 
households or small groups and are not correlated with losses by other groups—classic examples 
being indebtedness, illness, death or disability of a wage-earner, or other form of individual 
livelihood failure.202 The evidence available from longitudinal studies indicates that, even though 
much of food security programming is in response to covariate shocks (i.e., big emergencies), 
over time the determinants of a given household’s food security status—even in emergency-
prone areas—are to be found much more in the realm of idiosyncratic risk. There is increasing 
recognition of the need for programmatic responses to preventing or at least managing the effects 
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of idiosyncratic shocks.203 Generally coming to be referred to as social protection, this includes 
programs such as the Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia, or national pension schemes in 
several Southern African countries. This understanding about responses to vulnerability and risk 
have led to new ways of thinking about food security responses that attempt to address the gap 
between “transitory” and “chronic.” 204
Situating Food Security Programmatic Responses 
From this discussion, it is clear that defining firm boundaries for what constitutes “transitory” 
and “chronic” food insecurity is complicated, and it is misleading to define “emergency” 
programming as dealing with only with transitory or immediate needs and “development” 
programming as dealing with chronic poverty and vulnerability. The boundaries between these 
two have long been blurred at best. One useful way to think about these relationships—and the 
kinds of programming that are appropriate to each as well as the linkages required to ensure that 
an explicit focus on food security is successful—is depicted in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: Situating Programmatic Responses to Hunger
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Several points are highlighted by Figure 9. The first is that while “emergency response” and 
“longer-term development” were classically presented as opposite ends of a single spectrum or 
continuum, there are at least two dimensions to understanding the programmatic linkages: one is 
the temporal dimension (that is captured by the transitory/chronic element of programming); the 
other is understanding whether and how programs are intended to exclusively address symptoms 
of problems or the causes of those problems. With regard to addressing food security, this latter 
observation is probably more important than the temporal one. Thus, while programs addressing 
the symptoms of transitory food insecurity may be classified as “emergency response,” and 
programs addressing the causes of chronic food insecurity may be labeled as “building 
sustainable livelihoods,” there are other possible combinations—and therefore other kinds of 
interventions are required. These include primarily addressing symptoms (protecting 
consumption) over the longer term, and addressing or preventing the causes of food insecurity in 
the short term. This programming framework thus helps to situate the increasing interest in 
disaster risk reduction and social protection programming approaches, and significantly expands 
the way in which the gap between responses to chronic and transitory food insecurity can be 
addressed. While there has been much lip service given to both social protection and disaster risk 
reduction as categories of programs, they are still new categories—risk prevention doesn’t show 
up in official ODA accounting until 2005, and then only in miniscule amount. Social protection 
isn’t accounted as a sector or programmatic category.205
Figure 9 is useful for situating and understanding the objectives of different kinds of 
interventions, but it is not intended to imply that there are discrete boundaries between different 
combinations. In fact, ideally programs would have the flexibility to operate in any of these 
quadrants. Many of the interventions that could be described as emergency response may come 
to look like long-term safety net programs if transitory food insecurity becomes chronic—as for 
example in many protracted refugee crises. Likewise, many contemporary programs have 
objectives that simultaneously attempt to protect consumption in situations of chronic food 
insecurity, and also to build diversified livelihoods or improve household asset holdings—as 
indeed the Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia is designed to do.206 And in particularly 
risky environments, some programs are designed to specifically reduce the risk of shocks, but 
can quickly shift to protecting short-term food consumption if the situation calls for it—the 
Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative in the Greater Horn of Africa being a good example.207
All of these linkages are important to intervening in food insecurity in a given context with the 
appropriate range of responses. The exact nature of causes and symptoms, as well as temporal 
dimensions, is often determined by contextual factors and should influence the choice of tailored 
and appropriate approaches to protecting consumption, managing risk, and supporting livelihood 
assets and strategies. The rest of this section is devoted to looking in greater depth at disaster risk 
reduction and social protection programming as programmatic elements that support this aim. 
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3.2. Social Protection 
Overview 
Social Protection (SP) is an umbrella term used to describe a broad range of initiatives and 
transfers intended to reduce the economic and social vulnerability of the poor and food insecure. 
The concept of social protection evolved early this century from a narrow focus on food-based 
activities designed to smooth consumption during periodic downturns, to a more holistic 
framework incorporating notions of risk and instruments to reduce, manage, and cope with its 
effects208. This framework views vulnerabilities along a continuum of deprivation, recognizes 
that households face a multitude of risks that require a differentiated management approach, and 
drives home the notion that idiosyncratic shocks may be as common, and as damaging, as those 
shocks that affect many at the same time. An important shift has been the recognition that many 
social protection instruments are multi-pronged tools that can achieve a variety of objectives 
across this risk management spectrum—that is, a single type of intervention, if well-designed 
and implemented, could have effects that include both protection (of assets, livelihoods, 
consumption) and also promotion (of riskier, but possibly more productive, investments), 
contributing to a virtuous cycle of physical or human capital accumulation.  
The SP paradigm offers a useful conceptual linkage between the often divided realms of 
“emergency” and “development” responses to “chronic” and “transitory” food insecurity and, 
though actualizing these linkages is challenging, there are notable examples of progress from 
countries like Ethiopia, Zambia, and Bangladesh. As currently defined and implemented, social 
protection strategies are potentially most effective in stabilizing consumption among the 
predictably food insecure, though disaster risk reduction and political risk management offer 
options for reducing the need for humanitarian response to large-scale natural disasters and 
complex emergencies.  
Concepts and Definitions 
Social Risk Management (SRM) was formalized as the guiding framework for the World Bank’s 
social protection strategy with the release of the WB social protection sector strategy in 2001.209 
The intention of social risk management is to “provide instruments that allow the poor or 
vulnerable to minimize the impact of exposure to risk and change their behavior in a way that 
helps them exit poverty and lower their vulnerability.” 210 Social protection, as defined in the 
SRM, moves beyond the distribution of consumption safety nets to include interventions that 
reduce and mitigate risk while providing a “springboard” from poverty. Therefore, in order to 
understand how social protection links chronic and transitory food insecurity, it is necessary first 
to have a good grasp of concepts of risk and vulnerability. 
Risk and Vulnerability in Food Security. Risk and vulnerability are not new concepts to 
disciplines like public health, nutrition, and disaster management. However, though the notion of 
risk is implicit in the term “food insecurity,” only in the last fifteen years has there been growing 
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recognition of its potential to close conceptual and operational gaps in food security 
programming. Certain advances, like the adoption of risk management as a feature of the Food 
for Peace Title II strategy, show progress at the policy level, however, there continues to be a 
disconnect between the notable improvements seen in risk and vulnerability assessment, and 
attempts to translate this understanding into response.  
Though the terms “vulnerability” and “risk” are used differently even within the food security 
community,211 vulnerability is commonly viewed as a function of three principle components: 
(1) the risk, risky event, or shock; (2) the response to that risk; and (3) the associated outcome or 
welfare loss. The risk management approach is to avert this loss or transform a potential loss into 
a gain.212  
Risk and Vulnerability in Social Protection. The World Bank Social Risk Management 
framework and associated definitions and terminology predominates the social protection 
discourse, particularly among national government officials. The framework describes three 
types of risk management strategies: (1) risk reduction, (2) risk mitigation, and (3) risk coping. 
According to Holzmann and Jorgensen, risk reduction strategies are intended to prevent the 
materialization of a risk and include measures that were typically outside traditional SP 
frameworks, including sound macroeconomic policy, intervention in labor markets to ensure 
minimum standards, and investments in health and education.213 Risk mitigation strategies are 
put in place to reduce the impact of a risk should it occur. These instruments include a range of 
interventions such as formal and informal insurance, employment guarantees, asset transfers, and 
assistance for the diversification of both livelihoods, crops, and other investments in order to 
spread risk. Risk coping mechanisms are engaged in response to a risk that has materialized, and 
are intended to alleviate suffering and to prevent the disposal of assets, the curtailing of 
consumption, and other harmful responses to a shock. 
Using the SRM, it is tempting to map these three types of risk management approaches onto a 
continuum, whereby failure to reduce risk prompts the need for risk mitigation, and risk 
mitigation, if not handled properly, triggers the need for risk coping. This would direct us less 
usefully down a path of continuum thinking. Rather, a more accurate reality is one where 
reduction, mitigation, and coping are undertaken by a variety of actors operating concurrently in 
the face of a variety of different risks, both idiosyncratic and covariant. In this complexity, multi-
pronged instruments to manage risk must be chosen according to their objectives and context.  
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Social protection, in its ideal form, ensures a minimal level of welfare to its citizens, regardless 
of circumstances. The principles of stability, predictability, and timing of an intervention may be 
as critical to the SP intervention’s effectiveness as the resource transfer itself. These qualities 
enable beneficiaries to make informed decisions about how to manage in the face of risk based 
on a realistic assessment of the timing and size of available resources. They assist households 
with advance planning, and, the theory goes, this added security may enable greater risk-taking 
in investment that may pay-off as an eventual “springboard” from their poverty trap.214 The 
theory of “poverty traps” posits that there is a poverty threshold below which households cannot 
accumulate assets to raise themselves from poverty, and above which households can invest their 
assets to create a virtuous cycle of increasing returns and growth. Using this lens, ex ante (before 
a shock) social protection interventions enable those that are already below the threshold to 
accumulate the necessary assets to “graduate” from it, and to make riskier and therefore more 
productive investments. Barrett et al. argue that households that are not below the threshold 
should also be targeted ex ante in order to prevent a slide below the threshold from which it is 
much more difficult to recover.215 This discussion demonstrates that the target populations for 
social protection instruments may extend beyond those that experience transitory food insecurity. 
That is, those that are in need of transformative measures are also likely targets for preventive 
action and interventions to alleviate the potential of future suffering.  
A limitation of the SRM, echoed by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler216 is that it overly 
emphasizes transitory poverty/food insecurity resulting from an exogenous shock. In order to 
maximize the potential of this and similar frameworks, it is important to recall a reality where 
portions of the population are chronically poor and food insecure and continuously fall beneath a 
minimum standard of welfare due to structural constraints. In these cases, exogenous shocks only 
push them further into more severe deprivation. While “risk reduction” strategies in theory 
address this structural and persistent deprivation, the World Bank’s SRM does not usually 
include targeted, ongoing social support and service provision that should be aimed at the 
predictably, and chronically, food insecure.  
Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler217 also extend the SRM framework slightly, arguing that the 
WB’s limited definition of vulnerability promotes attention to risks to economic well-being, but 
not to the socio-political structure that gives birth to and sustains these risks. As such, they 
propose the inclusion of a “transformative” social protection element in the framework that 
addresses issues of social vulnerability in addition to economic vulnerability, including measures 
to correct the judicial and regulatory system in favor of particular marginalized groups. 
Social Protection in Practice 
In struggling with how to better to link chronic and transitory food insecurity responses, in order 
to improve the effectiveness of emergency intervention and reduce the need for assistance in the 
future, the humanitarian community has experimented with a variety of approaches, including 
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“building back, better,” “developmental relief,” “saving lives and livelihoods,” “post-disaster 
rehabilitation,” and “supporting positive coping strategies.” The starting point for formulating 
these approaches tends to be the crisis itself, and the debate often centers on what can be done 
from there forward to reduce future risk and promote improved security.218  
However, the SP approach requires determining in advance of a crisis which segments of a 
population are at risk from what sources, and intervening with mechanisms that are able to avert 
or mitigate a crisis before it occurs. This implies a redirection of funding away from mechanisms 
and institutions that are typically engaged to deal with emergency response, and in some cases, a 
different role for humanitarian assistance altogether. Because social protection refers to an array 
of possible interventions spanning multiple sectors with different objectives, in considering how 
SP can link chronic and transitory food insecurity it is helpful to organize the discussion 
according to the source of risk. 
Chronic Food Emergencies. Social protection strategies are likely to be most effective in 
countries, like Ethiopia, Bangladesh, or North Korea, where sizeable portions of the population 
face a chronic, but predictable, inability to produce or access sufficient quality and quantity of 
food. In these situations, lifecycle shocks or risk stemming from the combination of regular, 
localized climatic shocks, ill-functioning markets, insufficient production, and/or food price 
destabilization can worsen an already challenged capacity to cope and can tip the balance against 
those that were barely managing. In these types of circumstances, instruments that provide a 
seasonal safety net (employment guarantee schemes, conditional cash-transfers dependent on 
school or health clinic attendance) coupled with “promotional” options ranging from micro-
credit (to build household assets), food-for-work or cash-for-work (targeted to building 
community assets), asset transfers (e.g., revolving livestock funds), or production support 
(fertilizer subsidies) can offer a “livelihood package” that can meet immediate needs while 
building a buffer for the future.  
The challenges to doing so, successfully, rest on a number of preconditions, which include: (1) 
building political support for the notion that regular, predictable resource transfers, a.k.a. social 
welfare or consumption support, are a more cost-effective alternative to emergency response and 
are as important (and complementary) to overall economic development as productive 
investments; (2) building social protection into legislation or at least into a comprehensive 
strategy that is integrated with other policy frameworks like the PRSP the MDG strategy; (3) 
garnering sufficient resource commitments through non-emergency channels to support the 
sustained implementation of key social protection interventions; (4) making the institutional 
transition from emergency appeal to alternative institutional home, which is particularly 
challenging when “social protection” interventions lack a natural institutional home and require 
multi-sectoral cooperation; (5) ensuring that the institutional transition does not jeopardize the 
resource transfer; (6) targeting the program appropriately—targeting requirements include (a) 
correctly identifying the chronically and transitory food insecure, including those that are short 
of food year-round as well as during the lean season or during localized shocks, (b) targeting the 
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timing of the transfer so as not to provide disincentives to labor or production or to put 
inflationary pressure on food prices, and (c) targeting the type of transfer to the context; (7) 
ensuring that the transfer is, above all, delivered predictably and reliably; and (8) combining the 
transfer with a “livelihood package” or other asset generating intervention that can provide the 
eventual ladder which, in combination with the protective transfer, can be used to climb out of 
poverty and insecurity.  
This is certainly a tall order, and very few programs have met all of these pre-conditions, 
however, there are a growing number of governments that are willing to try. One of the most 
notable of these is the Ethiopian government, whose Productive Safety Nets Program (PSNP) 
was introduced in 2005 as an attempt to free itself from dependence on emergency food aid 
appeals and to reduce household vulnerability.219 The program targets the (up to) fourteen 
million Ethiopians in any given year that suffer predictable food deprivation even during periods 
of record harvest. The PSNP provides support, in the form of both food-for-work and cash-for-
work (depending on market infrastructure), offering guaranteed labor and income/food earning 
opportunity to households with productive members. Labor-deficit households qualify for free 
transfers in the form of direct cash or food support.220  
Institutionally, this program has required the re-routing of funds from the Annual Emergency 
Appeal managed by the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee (DPPC) to the Food 
Security Coordination Bureau, a new government institution charged with overseeing the PSNP. 
In order to reduce risks associated with the institutional shake-up, donors agreed to fund an 
initial phase wherein institutions were to be strengthened and prepared for the change-over. 
However, Haan et al. report that this change-over and “separation of roles” is causing some 
confusion within the DPPC over its new mandate.221  
A set of three initial evaluations focusing on an assessment of targeting, linkages to other food 
security programs, and the use of the transfer by beneficiaries, suggest that the program is well-
targeted, but errors of exclusion are high due to lack of resources.222 In addition, the transfer 
itself has not been entirely predictable, nor has it been timed always to coincide with the season 
just prior to the harvest, resulting in competition with on-farm labor requirements.223 The RVHP 
reports that linkages with other food security programs are not fully realized and, without them, 
the livelihood package that is needed to contribute to “graduation” from food insecurity is not 
being delivered to every target household. In fact, the report cautions that “graduation processes 
are complex and cannot simply be delivered through a safety net program alone.” 224  
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Since 2004 the Government of Ethiopia and a set of donors and UN, led by WFP, have been 
designing a drought shock complement to the PSNP with the goal of generating enough 
insurance and contingency funds to cover up to 6.7 million people in the case of a severe 
drought.225 226 The program, whereby farmers would receive cash payments in the event of a 
severe drought, was piloted by WFP and partner Axa Re in 2006. The next phase will involve 
national level scale up, improved contingency planning, capacity building and better early 
warning systems with built-in, guaranteed funding triggers. This is the first ever attempt of the 
humanitarian community to approach risk in a SP fashion, determining in advance of a crisis 
which segments of a population are at risk from what sources, and intervening with mechanisms 
that are able to avert or mitigate a crisis before it occurs.  
The Ethiopia example is in its early stages, and has yet to be evaluated for impact. However, 
many of the issues that were surfaced in these initial evaluations appear to have more to do with 
implementation constraints rather than with problems of high-level political support, government 
institutionalization, or the conceptualization of the program and its promising role as an 
alternative to the need for regular emergency food aid for large portions of the population. The 
implementation constraints are surmountable, but should not be underestimated.  
Rapid-Onset Natural Disasters. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) activities (discussed in more 
detail in the following section) can also be incorporated into a social protection framework, and 
offer clear links to reducing risk exposure and improving preparedness and response to large-
scale natural disasters. In practice, DRR measures often focus more explicitly than SP measures 
on reducing exposure to covariate sources of risk, such as large-scale climatic and geographic 
hazards, though the Global Review of Disaster Risk Reduction (2007) (GRDDR) attempts to 
improve the distinction between these and “low-intensity asset loss and livelihood disruption 
over extensive areas, where people and economic activities are exposed to episodic and highly 
localized, principally climatic hazard events.”227 In practice, DRR interventions do not target 
idiosyncratic risks to the household or an individual’s livelihood but rather to the context in 
which the household is situated, through interventions like improved land use planning and 
building retrofitting in Asian urban metropolises, the formation of catastrophic insurance pools 
in Turkey, or community-based contingency planning and the fortification of safe structures like 
schools in Bangladesh. Greater attention to measures that would reduce the impact of climatic 
and environmental risks on livelihoods and food insecurity is warranted. The GRDDR claims 
that “only a handful of countries reported making explicit linkages between efforts to adapt to 
climate change, to reduce disaster risk and to manage environmental change impacts on 
livelihood options and poverty trends.”228 They concluded that there was “little synergy among 
institutions responsible for disaster reduction and those responsible for climate change, 
environment, and…social development.” Improving such linkages is necessary to ensure that 
disaster risk reduction activities (including preparedness and mitigation) are based on risk and 
                                                 
225 Ulrich Hess, William Wiseman, and Tim Robertson. 2006. “Ethiopia: Integrated Risk Financing To Protect 
Livelihoods And Foster Development,” Discussion Paper, November. 
226 IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis. 2007. “Ethiopia Drought Insurance Extended to 6.7 Million People,” UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, December. 
http://www.irnnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=75865. 
227 Review of Disaster Risk Reduction. 2007. Geneva: United Nations Secretariat. 
228 Global Review of Disaster Risk Reduction. 2007. Geneva: United Nations Secretariat. p. 71. 
66 
vulnerability assessments, are targeted toward those population groups most at risk, and serve to 
protect and preserve livelihoods and food security in the face of covariate shocks.  
Complex Political Emergencies. Like most everything, social protection strategies work best in 
contexts with relatively stable and functioning governments, and operate even better when there 
is a democratically elected government whose citizens can hold it to account for the entitlements 
that they are due. Built on the principles of predictability and stability, a social protection 
strategy is only as good as the institutions that stand behind it. In a review of social protection 
policies in six southern African countries, Devereux traces the unraveling of the previously 
comprehensive social protection system in Zimbabwe under an increasingly fragile state with 
predatory politics.229 This underscores the need for protection for social protection! But at the 
same time, it highlights the precondition for social protection programs to have a well-
functioning state apparatus with certain minimal capacities and access to vulnerable citizens—
conditions which are rarely present in complex emergencies like Somalia, Sudan, and DRC.  
However, through involvement by multi-mandate agencies in what Devereux and Sabates-
Wheeler call the “transformative” aspect of social protection230—the reduction and mitigation of 
social and political risks, not just economic ones—it may be possible to reduce the types of 
underlying risks that contribute to conflict and that later manifest themselves in “complex 
emergencies.” Transformative social protection, by definition, involves the uprooting, or at least 
the threatening, of accepted power structures and would therefore be the most highly politicized 
of all social protection interventions. However, in keeping with the SP spirit of strategic and 
advance planning, the idea of linking transformative interventions to political and social risk 
assessments may have the benefit, in some circumstances, of reducing the roots of conflict. 
Improving conflict prevention activities is one approach to reducing this type of risk in advance, 
as is integrating conflict early warning into traditional disaster or famine early warning systems.  
Barrs argues for improved conflict preparedness which focuses on feeding conflict early warning 
information directly back to the affected population to improve their decision-making around 
anticipated or actual flares in violence, triggering a set of pre-planned responses or, at minimum, 
offering improved access to information and predictions that could ultimately be livelihood 
preserving and life-saving.231 Often, Barrs argues, this is the ideal direction for information to 
flow, given that humanitarian agencies are frequently constrained to act in conflict-induced 
emergencies. 
The Role of the Humanitarian Community 
The responsibility to act to prevent and mitigate the food insecurity of a citizenry through a 
comprehensive social protection strategy rests with national governments. As mentioned above, 
successful social protection would be evidenced by a reduced need for external humanitarian 
intervention. And yet, there are significant challenges to SP in practice. Countries with solid 
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capacity and well-functioning administrative structures are often wary of investing in social 
protection, particularly when SP is viewed as an expensive “hand-out” that could continue 
indefinitely. Though the concept of SP demands a strong role for government to correct for 
market failures, governments are often ill-equipped to administer comprehensive programs with 
intensive targeting and service delivery components. Governments also face significant 
budgetary constraints to carrying out these plans. In complex emergencies, where governments 
are not only low-capacity but possibly non-existent, there is no internal authority to administer a 
well-planned and targeted protection or response strategy.  
These challenges suggest a continued, though in many cases, modified, role for the humanitarian 
community. This role is not always clear given the tension between the humanitarian imperative, 
on the one-hand, and the need to avoid undermining national systems or absolving governments 
of their responsibility to address underlying vulnerabilities and to respond to crises. And yet, 
across the spectrum of government capacity and motivation, international NGOs are engaging 
with social protection strategies in various ways. A recent Wahenga Brief describes a range of 
modes of INGO participation in SP, from advocacy, to evidence building, to direct 
implementation. For example, HelpAge International assisted in consolidating commitments to 
SP among 16 African governments through its co-organization of the Livingstone Conference.232 
CARE has been implementing pilot cash transfer schemes in Zambia as a pre-cursor to national 
scale-up.233 And in Bangladesh, national NGOs are responsible for implementing government 
conditional transfer programs like the Vulnerable Group Development Programme.  
The author points to “a lack of unity around how INGOs approach social protection,” suggesting 
that there are several areas where INGOs need to adapt how they traditionally do business. One 
substantive area has to do with becoming better equipped to analyze and influence national 
policy, acquiring new skills and the understanding that policy processes are slow, longer-term 
and often largely outside the direct control of the organization. Despite the fact that NGOs and 
other humanitarian actors are often better positioned than governments to deliver services 
efficiently, their operations are generally small-scale and are driven by funding cycles with 
shorter time horizons than the principles of SP demand. Tibbo claims that NGO involvement in 
implementing SP has masked the low-capacity that many governments have to deliver SP 
programs, and suggests that NGO involvement should be geared toward facilitation rather than 
direct implementation.234 In addition to increasing their role in lobbying, advocacy, and capacity-
building, there is also a role for NGOs to participate in “social mobilization,” by engaging with 
civil society to hold states accountable to their social contracts and monitoring the extent to 
which social transfers are carried out as, and to whom, they are intended.235
Of course, social protection programs cannot solve all social problems or prevent all types of 
crisis, and thus there will continue to be situations where even the best SP programs fail in their 
objectives. However, engaging with the new SP agenda, and opening a dialogue around the 
means by which humanitarian actors can strategically utilize their unique skill sets (or acquire 
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others) to improve the likelihood of SP success, offers a promising option for reducing the need 
for external humanitarian intervention altogether. 
3.3. Issues and Trends in Disaster Risk Reduction  
Overview 
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (UN/ISDR) defines 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) as a “framework of opportunities for the prevention and mitigation 
of risks.” 236 Through activities like the development of disaster preparedness and early warning 
systems, the sustainable management and restoration of the environment, the construction of safe 
and disaster-resistant infrastructure, and the establishment of insurance and other financial 
strategies needed to respond to disasters,237 DRR aims to decrease the likelihood that shocks will 
occur, or, if they do occur, that they will cause damage. Among the various DRR strategies that 
exist, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)—accepted by 168 countries in 2005—is the most 
widely recognized. It aims to substantially reduce disaster losses, defined in terms of human life 
and social, economic, and environmental assets.238 As exemplified by the buy-in to the Hyogo 
Framework, DRR is increasingly considered to be fundamental to the sustainability of 
investments in human and economic development and can potentially serve as a link between 
efforts to reduce chronic food insecurity and responses to transitory food insecurity. Like social 
protection, DRR can, in theory, reduce the need for emergency response to food crises and, 
where an emergency response is needed, it can be better targeted and executed if prepared in 
advance.  
Despite all this, DRR programs often lack a clear and explicit conceptual link to food security, 
and there is little useful evidence that up-front investments in risk reduction are effective in 
maintaining food insecurity in the face of shocks. Analytic tools such as benefit-cost analysis and 
environmental impact assessment are increasingly used for determining the effectiveness of DRR 
programming,239 and should be refined to gauge the impact of DRR activities on household- and 
community-level food security.  
DRR Programs to Address Food Security 
DRR activities related to food security include famine early warning systems, environmental 
protection and management programs, community-based contingency planning, and strategies 
for improving the resilience of livelihoods to certain types of risks.  
Early Warning Systems. Early warning systems that predict rapid-onset hazards such as floods, 
earthquakes, hurricanes and cyclones, are widely implemented throughout developing and 
industrialized countries alike. Systems that monitor risks like drought and hyper-inflation and 
their effects on food security status and livelihoods are recognized as an integral element of 
disaster preparedness efforts.240 Such early warning systems aim to predict food shortfalls and 
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market failures by regularly monitoring data on agricultural production, rainfall, disease 
incidence, food prices, and political instability. These systems provide information that can be 
utilized by vulnerable populations, governments, and humanitarian actors to respond in order to 
avert a crisis or at least to reduce its scale and severity.  
Though early warning is intuitively a good thing, the actual value of food security early warning 
systems is largely unknown. Food security monitoring information is often used as evidence for 
soliciting resources from the international community, yet the extent to which early warning 
systems succeed in attracting resources is not easily measured. To do so, it would be necessary to 
discern what portion of aid received (e.g., from the CAP) can be attributed to the red flags raised 
by early warning information. Furthermore, to sufficiently test the “ounce of prevention equals a 
pound of cure” promise of early warning, the resources invested in early response must be 
assessed relative to the hypothetical cost of a “disaster averted.” Valuating the counter-factual of 
unknown magnitude is a challenge indeed, though from a humanitarian perspective the benefit of 
even a single potential life saved is worthy of these investments. 
As a cautionary note, the absence of evidence should not be equated with evidence of 
ineffectiveness. At this stage, “early warning is [considered] one of the most cost-effective, 
practical and effective measures for disaster prevention.” 241 Moving forward, it is important to 
pair advancements in early warning systems with impact monitoring to understand and improve 
the systems’ overall effectiveness.  
Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation. Sustainable environmental management and 
protection are integral to disaster risk reduction. Environmental hazards such as landslides, 
cyclones, and drought can be mitigated by restoring damaged ecosystems and augmenting 
existing environmental systems that can act as a physical barrier to such hazards. Not 
surprisingly, there is often a tension between the twin goals of environmental protection and food 
security, as long-standing ecosystems such as forests and wetlands have been altered to 
accommodate agricultural production or increasing population pressure.242 Not surprisingly, the 
“over development” of forests and wetlands has been shown to make communities more 
susceptible and less resilient to certain disasters induced by climate change.243  
Mangrove and other coastal forests offer a clear example of how natural ecosystems can reduce 
disaster risk while providing sources of livelihood for local communities. Mangroves have been 
shown to act as a bio-shield, protecting coastal communities from tsunamis, cyclones, and 
flooding.244 245 Livelihoods based on mangrove forests include fishing, hunting, and wood 
collection. Though shown to mitigate the impact of these disasters, the preservation and 
restoration of mangrove forests is complicated by the politics of competing land uses, including 
large-scale aquaculture activities such as shrimp farming—activities that don’t factor in the long-
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term costs of their actions to increased disaster susceptibility. According to one study, the 
“conversion of mangrove forest into commercial shrimp farming in southern Thailand appears to 
be financially attractive to investors, but this does not necessarily make conversion of mangroves 
to shrimp ponds economically worthwhile.” 246 In addition, the fact that “…local communities 
benefit from many direct and indirect uses of mangrove ecosystems and may have a strong 
incentive to protect these areas…puts them into direct confrontation with shrimp farm operators 
and, by proxy, government authorities.” 247 This example shows clearly that the technical or 
economic argument is not always sufficient to trigger action for disaster reduction when power 
and politics come into play.  
Prevention of desertification via the large-scale planting of trees is also seen as means of disaster 
reduction of, in this case, droughts. For communities who reside in arid climates, the reversal of 
desertification can lead to improved food security by preventing asset depletion, migration, and 
crop failure—common responses to drought conditions. And yet, increasing population pressures 
and competing economic interests often impel stakeholders to reject conservation practices in 
favor of agricultural expansion and industrial development.  
Though there is ample empirical evidence illustrating the economic value of conservation for 
disaster reduction, there is a large disconnect between this evidence and its translation into policy 
and practice. The dichotomy between short-term financial benefit and long-term economic 
viability, and the tension between local verses outsider control of resources illustrate certain 
challenges to environmental protection-related DRR and explain, in part, why numerous 
countries and communities continue to experience a chronic, and even worsening, vulnerability 
to disasters. For environmental protection to be a viable means of disaster reduction, 
development assistance must be prepared to play the role of mediator in order to achieve 
workable solutions between multiple and disparate interest groups.  
Improved Agricultural/Ecosystem Resilience. Another method of reducing disaster risk is to 
foster agricultural and ecosystem resilience. Resilience-enhancing interventions take several 
forms: the introduction of improved seed varieties248 or specialized plant varieties to withstand 
shocks (e.g., droughts, floods),249 sustainable farming practices to mitigate the impact of 
disasters,250 the planting of trees to prevent erosion and retain soil moisture,251 and the 
management of watersheds to augment water supplies.252  
The introduction of improved seed varieties has been particularly widespread as a resilience-
enhancing strategy both in pre- and post-disaster situations. Anecdotal evidence of the 
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effectiveness of improved seeds planted pre-disaster is extensive, but little empirical evidence 
exists on whether they play the role that they are expected to in mitigating crop damage from 
drought or flood. Furthermore, many DRR interventions that utilize improved seed varieties 
occur at the village or sub-village level, making the generalization of findings from small-scale 
studies difficult. In Bangladesh, Oxfam introduced bean and papaya seed varieties that are 
resistant to flooding. These flood-resistant crops were harvested during the typical food gap 
period, and their sales “helped diversify livelihoods and created a new source of income during a 
critical period of the year.” 253  
Similar seed-focused activities occurred in the wake of Hurricane Mitch to build resilience to 
future shocks.254 Though these seed programs assisted farmers to recover from the Hurricane’s 
effects, it is unclear if these, frequently “one-off,” input injections will make farmers more 
resilient to disasters in the future, since their success depends on continued use and sustained 
adoption. There are potential economic disincentives to using seeds bred for flood resistance 
when disasters are not imminent, as crops grown from traditional varieties may be more 
demanded for consumption and command a higher price than the improved seed varieties. For 
reasons like these, the decision-making process surrounding the decision to use improved seeds 
as a major component of the response to Hurricane Mitch has been criticized for its failure to 
rely on sound evidence or sufficient analysis.255
One method of assessing the effectiveness of such activities has been to examine conditions post-
disaster, comparing locales that were equally exposed to a shock but had different agricultural 
practices, in order to ascertain which had experienced the least damage and the easiest recovery. 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, for example, a comparison between conventional farms and 
farms that employed agro-ecological and land management practices concluded that the latter 
“…suffered 58 percent less surface erosion in Honduras, 70 percent less in Nicaragua and 99 
percent less in Guatemala.” 256 Though successful at reducing erosion, these practices were not 
shown to reduce the severity of landslides. This study, however, does not contain an analysis of 
the food security situation of both farming groups after the disaster. The ambiguity of these 
conclusions and absence of food security analysis is common to resilience studies, and can be 
seen as a serious gap in research on agricultural resilience. 
Though the results of the studies are promising, empirical evidence is limited, and much is still 
unknown about the effectiveness of employing agricultural/ecosystem resilience practices.257 
Furthermore, whilst the examination of resilience post-disaster may support theory and help to 
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generate hypotheses, it reveals little about the actual effectiveness of resilience enhancing 
programs. Though recovering from disasters is often costly, a comparison of pre- and post- 
disaster costs is needed to ascertain if agricultural/ecosystem resilience activities make economic 
sense. Indeed, such an analysis would also provide policymakers with insight into how best to 
encourage and promote resilience-building policies. Furthermore, it would illuminate factors that 
are generalizable to success, and not dependent strictly on local, idiosyncratic characteristics.  
Coordination of DRR Programs 
Understanding how best to coordinate DRR programs is key to their effectiveness and often 
underpins success. The coordination of DRR activities occurs at the international, national, and 
at the local level. Coordination is key to timely and accessible funding, program and policy 
development, and effective response.  
At an international level, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 
WFP, FAO, and World Meteorological Association (WMO) are involved in programs linked to 
DRR and food security. Most notable of these systems is FAO’s Global Information and Early 
Warning System on food and agriculture (GIEWS), which monitors food production, food 
prices, climatic conditions, and food crises. By analyzing and publishing findings regularly, 
GIEWS “provides timely and reliable information so that appropriate actions can be taken by the 
governments, the international community, and other parties.” 258 Though the information 
GIEWS provides is an indispensable resource, great coordination is needed to translate this 
information into effective disaster responses. According to the UN’s Global Survey on Early 
Warning Systems, “[r]esponse plans often do not work due to lack of coordinated reaction 
among the main actors. The lines of responsibility and authority need to be clear to all to ensure 
coordination and effective implementation of response plans.” 259  
In addition to information, the international agencies are able to readily advocate for and procure 
funding, particularly in cases of disaster response. Quick response in the aftermath of a disaster 
is critical for preventing further losses of life and livelihood. Two funding mechanisms, the 
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), are recent 
developments in the disaster response community, and play slightly different roles. Managed by 
the UN secretariat and launched officially in 2006, the CERF is a “standby fund” available for 
both “sudden onset emergencies” and “chronically under-funded emergencies…[by] 
strengthen[ing] core elements of humanitarian response” throughout the world.260 In contrast, 
MDTFs are country specific pooled-funds financed by multiple donor countries and 
implemented by a singular agency or organization.261 These funding mechanisms mark the return 
to a more stable and impartial funding framework, whereby funding is both more available and 
dispersed to meet long-term objectives. As both funds are relatively new, careful monitoring of 
the effectiveness of dispensed funds (at all levels) is suggested.  
National level coordination efforts are managed primarily by a range of government sectors. The 
effectiveness of state agencies is based on governance structures, organizational and technical 
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capacities, and resources. In a recent survey of National Meteorological and Hydrological 
Services, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) concludes that “legal and governance 
mechanisms are available but are still limiting implementation of DRR initiatives in 72 of 139 
countries.” 262 Enhancing the abilities of pre-existing government entities is critical for disaster 
preparedness as well as reducing long-term risk through sustainable development practices. Cuba 
offers an example of a country that has repeatedly withstood natural hazards (e.g., hurricanes). 
By encouraging a community-based disaster preparedness approach, committing the necessary 
resources to prepare for and respond to shocks, and by utilizing local modes of communication, 
Cuba has been able to repeatedly prevent disaster.263 Though disaster rarely threatens Cuba’s 
food security, its geographic similarity to more food insecure countries such as the Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, and Grenada, demonstrates that disaster losses can be prevented even in locales 
susceptible to recurrent shocks when the proper systems are in place and are well-coordinated.  
DRR and disaster preparedness strategies are most often actualized at the local level. Community 
Based Disaster Management (CBDM) has been recognized as a powerful approach for 
promoting community resilience to disasters and fostering long-term sustainable development.264 
265 Communities often have “good practices” already in place that, if identified, can be scaled up 
and out. Identifying and disseminating such practices has been recognized as a practical means 
of reducing risk without the need of high-cost external inputs and practices. In addition to 
empowering local communities to implement their own DRR strategies, greater awareness of 
local needs facilitates the delivery of disaster-response services from the outside. Information 
materials pre- and post-disaster must be available in local languages to be an effective as an 
education strategy.266 Community-based initiatives are also highly practical, particularly when 
governmental capacity is low and resources for DRR are scarce.  
FAO’s regional project “Assistance to improve local agricultural emergency preparedness in 
Caribbean countries highly prone to hurricane related disasters” provides a current example of 
multiple-tiered DRR coordination that attempts to enhance food security. As previous DRR 
programs’ exclusion of agriculture had “significantly reduced the resilience of the sector to cope 
with extreme hydro-meteorological hazards,” 267 FAO “assist governments…to support the food 
security of farmers in the most hazard prone areas by improving institutional frameworks and 
technical options for hurricane related disaster preparedness, emergency response and post 
emergency agricultural assistance.” Established in 2005, the project established “district disaster 
committees…to facilitate the involvement of communities in disaster planning.” 268 The 
organizational structure of these committees fostered the flow of information from the local to 
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national level, ultimately informing government policy. Furthermore, each committee established 
a set of “good practices for hazard preparedness in agriculture” which were incorporated in 
regional information system. These steps are crucial as there was previously “no 
mechanism…that effectively facilitates comprehensive prevention and mitigation planning for 
hurricane related disasters at the farm level.”269 Though this project is still in its infancy, it offers 
an example of how coordination and expertise can flow both top-down and bottom-up.  
Measuring Effectiveness of DRR Programs  
Analytical tools such as cost benefit analysis and environmental impact assessment show 
particular promise for analyzing the effectiveness of DRR programs related to food security. 
Though these tools are widely used in “development” contexts, their application to risk-reduction 
strategies is nascent. To date, measurement activities related to DRR pay greater attention to 
measuring the costs of economic losses and lives lost than determining the benefit of preserved 
assets and lives saved. The difficulty required to determine a disaster’s immediate and long-term 
costs and benefits may explain (at least in part) why few effectiveness measurement tools have 
been developed and applied to DRR strategies. 
Cost Benefit Analysis. The application of cost benefit analysis techniques to DRR is novel as it 
provides an opportunity to determine the effectiveness of disaster preparedness activities. The 
technique works on the assumption that investments in disaster preparedness can both benefit the 
community and reduce losses in the face of recurrent shocks. The study discussed below applies 
cost benefit analysis to a situation of recurring disasters where a hazard can be predicted and 
regularly monitored. This approach enables practitioners to accurately assess whether the 
benefits gained from disaster preparedness activities are greater than the total cost of the 
intervention and disaster combined. Additionally, studying DRR using cost benefit analysis 
enables researchers to determine if an area has become less vulnerable and to discern which 
interventions were most effective at reducing vulnerability.  
The Khammam District in India’s Andhra Pradesh province was host to a study that examined 
the cost benefit ratio of a disaster mitigation and preparedness project. To reduce risk to seasonal 
floods and droughts, the project included both physical infrastructure and capacity building 
components. In regards to food security, the project included “alternative cropping” strategies, 
specifically the introduction of hybrid seed varieties bred to withstand diseases common during 
flooding and diesel powered irrigation pumps to be used during periods of drought.270 
Unfortunately, the findings were released only after the first year of implementation, and “it 
[was] not possible to definitively assign benefits to the alternative cropping component.” 271 
Though unable to calculate definitively the cost/benefit ratio for this component, the explicit 
inclusion of a livelihoods-based activity is a welcome rarity to DRR programming.  
Environmental Impact Assessment. Like cost benefit analysis, environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) has potential to be applied to the measurement of disaster reduction and mitigation. When 
an environmental protection or rehabilitation is believed to reduce risk, EIA is a ready tool “to 
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examine the environmental consequences, both beneficial and adverse, of a proposed 
development project and to ensure that these consequences are taken into account in project 
design.” 272
When considering reducing vulnerability of agricultural systems, EIA can be used to identify 
areas most susceptible to environmental hazards. Identification of those areas most at risk of 
hazards enables communities to reassess the location of their agricultural activities or utilize 
inputs (e.g., seeds) that can persist in harsh conditions. 
In measurement terms, EIA permits the valuation of agricultural land and community 
ecosystems. Valuation pre-disaster subtracting for improvement and rehabilitation cost can be 
compared with post-disaster conditions to assess the environmental resilience to specific hazards. 
Furthermore, EIA can be combined with other tools such as risk and vulnerability assessment to 
develop a clearer picture of those areas most in need of DRR intervention.  
3.4. Emergencies, Social Protection and Disaster Risk Reduction 
Social protection, as a holistic framework for social risk management, includes responses 
typically categorized as “social safety nets” but goes far beyond to include a variety of other 
instruments, categorized according to whether they focus on risk reduction, mitigation, or 
response. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) falls within the umbrella of social protection, though it 
is rarely linked institutionally or in practice, given that DRR typically deals with covariate 
shocks while the intended effects of SP programs are more immediately linked to food security 
and livelihood outcomes, including idiosyncratic shock. The SP and DRR frameworks offer a 
number of features that hold promise as a way of linking chronic and transitory food insecurity. 
These features have as much to do with the principles and mode of implementation as they do 
with the types of interventions themselves.  
Social protection policies, in their ideal form, have a number of useful “linking” features—in 
particular, features to reduce the need for emergency responses to transitory food insecurity: (1) 
They are pre-planned and preventive, both by bolstering a household’s ability to withstand 
predictable shocks and by improving the response to a shock if it occurs. An example of the 
former is a safety net program that regularly transfers resources to the predictably food insecure 
to avert the need to sell assets in order to cover a food gap. An example of the latter is a 
community-based disaster preparedness plan that can be put into action should the anticipated 
disaster strike. (2) They are well-targeted and appropriate to the type of risk and type of food 
insecurity. This implies that ideally social protection programs have identified major risks and 
population groups facing those risks, and developed an appropriate response, one that typically 
requires disaggregating the response to different portions of the population. For instance the 
Ethiopian PSNP gives either cash or food, depending on market infrastructure in the region the 
program is being implemented. It distinguishes between those households with productive labor 
and those without. It also meant to link those lacking assets to asset-promoting livelihood 
packages that will enable them to graduate from the regular need for cash or food assistance. It is 
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a program that, on paper, is disaggregated in its response according to the populations’ 
vulnerability profile. (3) They are predictable and timely. The predictability of the resource 
transfer is a critical precondition to enabling households to effectively use resources for 
maximizing consumption and for investment in riskier activities with higher returns that may 
boost their asset base and free them from poverty traps, reducing chronic food insecurity. (4) 
They are typically managed and implemented by governments, rather than by the external 
humanitarian assistance community. Though SP interventions do typically require multi-sectoral 
collaboration, which makes the cohesive coordination of a SP strategy challenging, the fact that 
there is domestic institutional responsibility for social protection implies that there is a political 
commitment and measure of accountability to reducing transitory and chronic food insecurity by 
addressing chronic problems. Though SP and DRR appear promising in theory, in practice 
implementation breaks down or effectiveness cannot or has not been gauged. This prompts 
several questions for consideration of these frameworks as guides for linking chronic and 
transitory food insecurity. 
1. Could the development of a coherent social protection program with DRR elements do away 
with the need for emergency response altogether? If not, what are the risks associated with 
reallocating funds away from humanitarian actors with the ability to respond to crisis and 
toward other government institutions?  
2. Do social protection policies have too many preconditions for success to make them worth 
taking these risks? If SP is embedded in government institutions, and are only as sound as the 
institution that backs them, then how best should SP-related efforts focus on institution 
strengthening?  
3. Can the principles of SP work in areas where government is not strong, and what happens if 
governments fail?  
4. Is there a role for humanitarian agencies in carrying out social protection strategies, and if 
yes, what is it?  
These types of questions, among others, are important considerations for determining how, and 
whether SP, DRR, and social risk management can serve as the link that the humanitarian 
assistance community has sought between problems of chronic and transitory food insecurity. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS  
ARISING FROM THE PAPER 
Rather than simply summarizing the discussion presented in the foregoing discussion of the 
Themes, this conclusion section poses some general questions for discussion at the Food Security 
Forum. While most of these do not have consensus answers, they summarize the debate on 
humanitarian food security, and the way in which the humanitarian community must respond to a 
changing global situation. 
The first set of questions centers around analytical capacity (assessments of need, measurement 
of impact); the ability to allocate resources impartially; the ability to link analysis or early 
warning to a timely and appropriate response; balanced responses to food security crises and the 
engagement of humanitarian food security actors at the policy level; and limited ability to link 
the short-term protection of food consumption with long-term improvements in production and 
access. 
1. How can the humanitarian food security “community” improve its analysis to reflect 
changing realities on the ground, enable appropriate responses, and improve timeliness of 
response?  
2. How can impact measurement be significantly improved and incorporated routinely into 
program management? To what extent should resources be invested in assessing impact? 
3. What are the most salient conceptual and analytical constraints to improved linkage in short-
term (“transitory”) responses and longer-term (“chronic”) responses? 
4. How can improved analysis be better linked in a practical way to improved engagement at 
the policy level? How can humanitarian actors improve the linkage between their actions in 
the field, and the programs, policies and institutional requirements for sustainable, long-term 
improvements in food security?  
The second set of questions focuses on the effectiveness of response itself. The innovation and 
scale of food security responses continue to be hampered by the lack of dedicated resources, 
limited interface between humanitarian food security interventions and post-crisis activities; and 
scarce attention to risk reduction through such interventions to protect again future shocks.  
5. What qualifies as an early recovery response? What kinds of activities coming under the 
rubric of “food security interventions” can be included in the earliest stages of relief 
operations? How much “early recovery” funding can be justified in flash appeals versus 
CAPs?  
6. How can response analysis—weighing the costs and benefits of responding to assessed needs 
through different programmatic modalities—be made a regular part of the way in which 
humanitarian food security responses are carried out? 
7. How important is the impartial allocation of resources to humanitarian food security 
response? Is the “community” willing to fight (against significant political odds) for greater 
impartiality? 
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8. To what extent is the lack of capacity/engagement of national governments in chronic 
poverty and food insecurity a major constraint to being able to address the food security 
problem comprehensively? What should the humanitarian community do about it?  
9. How should institutional learning and processing of painful lessons from mistakes be 
incorporated better into humanitarian planning and action? How can the learning be made 
collective (i.e., inter-agency, not just within agencies)? 
10. Could the development of a coherent social protection program with DRR elements do away 
with the need for emergency response altogether? If not, what are the risks associated with 
reallocating funds away from humanitarian actors with the ability to respond to crisis and 
toward other government institutions?  
11. Within an expanded role for humanitarian actors, how should priorities for engagement be 
set? 
The third related set of questions focuses on aid architecture. 
12. What are the benefits and drawbacks of having a “food security cluster” to enhance 
effectiveness and coordination?  
13. What mechanisms are possible to hold cluster leads more accountable for inaction or 
ineffective coordination?  
14. How should agencies be structured—to specialize (in “humanitarian” or “development” 
areas) or to expand to cover various forms of activity and timing, with the skill-bases of 
personnel broadened accordingly? To what extent should investing in local partnerships 
based on comparative advantage be the way forward in responding to complex risks and their 
impact on the food security of vulnerable or crisis affected populations? 
15. How can the humanitarian community effectively engage with the private sector 
(corporations, industry, foundations, etc.) in activities that go beyond saving lives; that is, 
into more developmental domains that require longer-term engagement? Additionally, should 
the humanitarian community engage with private sector entities in areas where accountability 
on ethics, market penetration, and influence over consumer behavior are all important 
considerations? 
The fourth set of questions focuses on funding of food security responses. 
16. OCHA considers the time ripe for a review and adaptation of the flash appeal mechanism 
because more disasters means more shocks in locations where there is no CAP in place, and 
no humanitarian coordinator. On the other hand, many natural disasters are manifesting as 
overlays on top of simmering complex emergencies (consider the complications to response 
options to the tsunami in parts of Aceh and Sri Lanka because of pre-existing armed 
struggle). This means that separate funding streams and activities for CAPs and Flash 
Appeals may be increasingly artificial and self-defeating. How should such a review and 
change to appeals mechanisms take place? 
17. The innovative example of drought insurance coverage in Ethiopia suggests a promising role 
for private sector cooperation in insuring against disaster. What are the key issues that need 
to be worked through in order to expand this model to other countries and other types of 
disasters? 
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The fifth set of questions relates to policy reform. “Reform” is a mantra of the UN system and 
many NGOs are taking a new look at their mandates, roles and future (such as CARE’s policy 
decision to opt out of monetization of US food aid). But momentum can be lost, and with many 
new players on the scene there is potential for dispersal of policy harmonization. Maintaining 
momentum will require attention to capacity building. Maintaining momentum on funding is one 
issue, but many neglected emergencies appear to have serious absorptive capacity constraints to 
deliver services and activities supportive of food security (as opposed to humanitarian response).  
Climate change represents both a challenge and an opportunity in this regard. The potential for 
more frequent and bigger shocks carries with it the danger that even more humanitarian 
assistance will be called for, and allocated to, relief responses to major catastrophes—with less 
available for, and limited traction in dialogue on, longer term interventions that go deeper into 
the social protection and risk reduction functions of food security interventions. The positive side 
is that as economic costs of large disasters continue to grow (assets damaged and lost, income 
streams impaired, national economic growth compromised), more attention may be paid to the 
potential for investing in developmental relief, effective mitigation, and disaster risk reduction. 
While greater integration (at least in terms of UN response) is a plus on the side of integrating 
short-term and longer-term responses, it presents challenges in terms of integrating humanitarian 
action under the aegis of political and security concerns in complex emergencies, limiting 
humanitarian independence and impartiality. 
18. How can the humanitarian community do a better job of costing “preventive” measures 
(ounce of prevention versus pound of cure), arguably drawing from methodologies such as 
DALY calculations to better cost and compare alternative invests in relation to single (or 
multiple) metrics?  
19. What are the trade-offs, from the perspective of humanitarian food security actors, between 
improved coherence of transitory and chronic responses on the one hand, and decreased 
independence of humanitarian action in complex emergencies on the other? 
20. What is the role for humanitarian agencies in promoting improved policies and capacities in 
social protection and DRR?  
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